PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5392

PARTIES ) BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGLNEERS
TO )
DISPUTE ) C SY TRANSPORTATION, INC. (FOR.MER SEABOARD COAST LLYE
RAILROAD COMPANY)

AWARD NO. 6 CASE NO. 6

ST-ATENTENT ()F CLATVt


nPINTON OF BOARD
Claimant has been in the Ca.-_.'er's
service since August 11, 1981 and has
been an Engineer since Auzust =5. 1989.
As a result of charges dated Febr _,a.-z 20,
1992, investigation held Februr~ 25,
199? and by letter dated March =6, 1992,
Claimant was dismissed f:-o,n se--vice
stemming from his operation as Entrie

on assignment Y15015 on February 13, 1992 when, while ope mtina through the Dirt Road Track, Claimant's rain was involved in a collision with En^._cr~-.e ?=14 on Job Y 103 at ~ar^det Yard.

Ordinarily, our funcucn is :o examine the record to dewi:.ine who-`.er the Car--^er's disciplinary action was supported by substantial e·rd'T^.ce. Although the parties have vigcrcus:y ad-


dressed that issue, because of lectors written by Claimant, we are unable to perform our ordinari function. In levers written by Claimant dated April 11 and 25, 1992 (Car. Ex hs. E and G), Claimart effectively admitted engaging in rrssconduct and specifically sought leniency from the Carrier:


I have learned from my mistakes . ... I wish chat you could show me some mercy... I need my job and I am asmng for any lienacy [sic] that you can show me.


It is well-established that it is not this Board's func:ion to dis-oense lenie7.cv. That func-ion belones :o :::e

PLB 5392, Award 6
J. W. Davis
Page 2

Carner.l Given Claimant's clear admission of misconduct and his request for leniency, we have no authority to determine in the ordinary fashion that the decision to impose discipline was improper.

However, although Claimant's requests for leniency deprive this Board of the ability to determine in the usual manner whet.'ier discipline was apprepr:ate, the imposition of leniency is nevertheless subject to review by us but under the limited standard of detet-ini:.g whether the Carrier's actions were arbitrary or capricious?


it is "without consideration and :n disre
gard of facts and circumstances of a
case, without rational basis,


or excuse." Here, we are, not that the evidence supports a finding u"



t See erg., PL3 166, Award 1:
Leniency is a matter to be decided by
Carrier; and whichever way such decision
aces. the Board has no power to chr.ge it
A direct request for leniency, like the one
here, implies acceptance by Petitioner of
Carrier's decision on the merits. The 3oard
may not properly change such a circum
stance, especially under the facts of dtis
case, which show that :he penalty y -Lm--csed
by Carrier was reasonably related :o the se
riousness of claimant's offense and :o his
past performance. Corner's decis:en was
not arbitrary or an abuse of managensl ds
oredcn.

?,gain, see PLB 166. Award 1 (d.-_-:pining that "Carrier's dec:sicn was not arbitrary or an abuse of managerial discstion.'~.

Sourn Czntr2l Bell 7elevrtcne Co.. 52 L.A 1 104. 2 109 !Platt 19699).

the Carrier's actions in determining whether to ,grant leniency were non-arbitrary. The record shows that the collision involved in this case occurred in Hamlet Yard as a result of non-coordinated movements. Yet, in determining whether or not to grant leniency, the Carrier made Claimant pass a test on road territory (which Claimant did not do to the Carrier's satisfaction). See Division Superintendent Davis' letter of Aug'ist 28, 1992 (Car. Exh. N):




We recognize that there is an overlap of sImlls between road and yard service. We further recognize that Claimant has performed road serrice. But, this record nevertheless does not sufficiently explain why a road test was given as the basis for leniency when the collision was a result of movements attached to yard service. We cannot find a rational basis or justification for the type of test that the Carrier used to determine whether to grant leniency.

The Carrier has great discretion in determining the qualifications of its employees and it is not the function of rhisBoard to substitute our judgment for that of the Crier. But, the basis for the Carrier's decisions must at least be explained. That was not sufficiently done

in this case. We therefore are compelled to find that the Carrier's basis for determining whether or not to ;rant leniency was arbitrary.


The remedy in this matter shall be limited. Given the context in which this case arises, we can only require that Lie Carier make its determination of whether to return Claimant to service through use of reasonable criteria. In this case, we shall pernit Claimant's return to serrice, but only if he satisfactorily demonstrates to the Carrier through a test of his yard abilities that he can safely operate the necessary equipment Claimant's return to service is furhe: continent upon his successful completion of all other qualifying require^eats, including physical examinations. Given the fact that Claimant has effectively admitted to the charged misconduct as demonstrated by his requests for leniency, should Claimant successfully qualify, reinstatement shall be without loss of seniority or other rights and benefits, but shall be without compensation for time lost s


The fact that C:aimant tray have agreed to those terms does not change our conclusion. The terms must nevertheless be reasonable. T:vs is not a case like Award 3 of :his Board where she agreed upon imposition of compliance with =A? requirements as a condition preceent to ream to service was not unreasonable in light of the demonstrated misconduct by the employer. We cannot say the same in this case.


5 T :e Crganizadon's arguments hat C:3itnant
was deprived of a fair hearing are :e;ec-d.

PLB 5392, Award 6
J. W. Davis
Page 3

AWARD
To the limited extent set forth in the opinion, the claim is sustained.


Neutral Member

A. B. Montgo ery
Carter Member

E. L Hayd~IZ-,
OrgarLiz3don ~Ie. e.'~

Jacksonville, Florida

Dated: zc ,~Ey

Indeed. Claimant admitted that he was given a fair hearing. See Tr. 101:
[Q]. Mr. Davis, do you feel this has been a
fair and impartial investigation?
[A]. Yes, sir.