More than a few letters exchanged hands between the parties with the Employees protesting the dismissal and the Carrier affirming Its findings.
Claimant's "crime" was that In 18913, he had pled guilty to a disorderly conduct charge, a plea bargain that reduced that charge of recklessly handling, displaying or discharging a deadly weapon or dangerous Instrument His sentence was a fine and a probationary period with the understanding that at the conclusion of the probation, the sentence could then be vacated.
This guilty plea to a crime that could have been, and was eventually vacated, became a centerpiece of the Organisation's defense during the Investigation with references to the Black's Law Dictionary definition of vacated.
Claimant Introduced several letters from his attorney who did arrange to vacate the guilty plea, but only after Claimant received the notice of the Investigation but prior to the actual Meaning which had been postponed several tines.
tt Is clear from Claimant's attorney that Claimant either misunderstood his attorney's advice or procrastinated on securing the vacate order. This differs somewhat from the findings in Third Division Award 24463 which found that Clsimants attorney did mislead him In believing the conviction would be vacated.
The following question and Claimant's response clearly demonstrates that Claimant was fully cognizant of the plea agreement he entered Into In 1996, when he completed his application for employment:
Furthermore, when referencing the Inaudlbis, the Employees stated that not only was the transcript incomplete, but it was also altered.
This is a serious challenge to the disciplinary process. It is, however, an afflrtnabve defense that sit the burden of proof to the shoulders of the party making that defense. Other than saying it happened, they must clap what was omitted and where the omission occurred to the record, that is, to the best of their recollection. This has not been done.
The Carrier did not respond directly to this challenge on the property, but it has Included In its letter In the on-property handling the following:
The aforsquoisd generic rejection and denial Is sufcient to overcome any argument that even though they did not respond directly, they die! consider the argument and rejected and denied IC
Mother challenge was that the Carrier had already prejudged Claimant's fatsThey cite the testimony of the Carrier's Director of Hunan Resources and cited his offer to Claimant of a cash settlement If Claimant would simply resign.
This Is not a matter for this Board's considaradon in that k was an offer of settlement that was not accepted. Any such offers of settlement not accepted have to be treated as nonirdstsnt
2000. k did not refer to the August 23, 2000, Investigation but is did set forth the discipline and the mason therefore. !t also was rendered promptly.
Insomuch as there does not exist a violation of the agreed to Discipline Rule in that then Is no specific agreed to fonnat as to how the dbclpilne notice Is to read, the Board does find a decision following the Investigation was rendered as promptly as possible. As the Carrier stated In its letter to the General Chairman on November 6, 2001, "Even though the letter does not address the hearing directly, It was issued following the hearing and Is the decision you suggest was not rendered at al ...." It Is evident that a disciplinary letter was written that was not in violation of the Agreement
The Organisation also alleges that the only reason tM Carrier set out to do a background check on Claimant was because he had filed a harassment SUL
Why the Carrier launched a comperes and thorough background check of Claimant is not signMcant arid does nothing to mitigaes against the charges assestsd.
Another challenge was the fact the Superlmandertt wrote tits notice of charges and rendered the discipline which impugned the validity of the disciplinary process, is denied by the Bard. TM Superintendent was not at the Investigation.
Thus, when he got a copy of fete gation or how he reached his declolon IsFurthermore, the Superintendent was not the sole Judge of the Incident. The entire matter was appealed to the Labor Relations dspruwtent who 1rwspendwatly reviewed !ha transcript and supported the Superintendent's decision.
TM Employees also argue that even with a record such as Claimant had, and even though he did not reveal his criminal conviction, the Carrier would have hired
Page 7 PL-8 N 0. Soso Award No. 195ORGANIZATION MEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
CASE NO. 195 OF PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5850
It has been said more than once that one school of thought among railroad industry arbitration practitioners is that dissents are not worth the paper they are printed on because they rarely consist of anything but a regurgitation of the arguments which were considered by the Board and rejected. Without endorsing this school of thought in general, it is recognized that a dissent is required when the award is not based on the onproperty handling. Such is the case here.
Public Law Board (PLB) 5850 was set up to resolve disputes between the ATSF and the BMWE under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act. The Neutral of this Board, as well as the Carrier and Employe Members, are to address and only address disputes or controversies between the parties that are brought to them. The Neutral, in effect, breaks the deadlock for the parties on the issue in question when the Carrier and Employe Members do not agree. However, when there is no dispute or controversy concerning the facts, there is no deadlock to break and the Neutral has no alternative but to accept undisputed information as fact. This Board has stated as much in previous awards. For example, in Case No. 85 the Board stated the following:
These are examples of Awards of this Board that are correctly on point and are in line with awards of other Boards as well. An example of others is PL13 6302 Case No. 6, Award No. 14 which unfortunately involved yours truly as the Employe Member:
The decision in this case simply ignored this well-established principle as there were several issues before this Board where no dispute or controversy existed on the property concerning pertinent details, yet, the majority failed to accept the information as fact. The following illustrates this point.
During the on-property handling, the Employes claimed the Carrier violated Rule 13 (e) in that the hearing transcript furnished was incomplete and altered in an attempt to distort the facts which totally disregarded Claimant's rights to due process. This claim was made by General Chairman Hemphill during on-property handling. Mr. Hemphill was the representative at the investigation, therefore, he knows what took place at the investigation and recognized that the transcript did not accurately reflect what occurred, so, he made the claim accordingly. The Carrier offered nothing in response to this claim. The Neutral of this Board was the first and only one to document any argument in regard to the incomplete transcript. The Neutral recognized the Employes' claim as a serious challenge to the disciplinary process, however, he further categorizes it as an "affirmative defense that shifts the burden of proof to the shoulders of the party making the defense." Such a contention is just plain wrong and illustrates the Neutral's unexplainable eagerness to defend the Carrier's handling of this matter. Simply stated, the burden of furnishing proof in support of the Employes' claim does not exist absent a denial of the allegation from the Carrier. In support of this well-established fact, one need only to refer to PLB 6302 Case No. 6 already quoted above which addresses this principle specifically by stating:
In that case, which again involved yours truly, a similar "generic rejection" with identical meaning was contained in the Employes' on-property correspondence as well, which did nothing to change the opinion of the Neutral of that Board. Hence, the Neutral's position here is in serious error.
Notwithstanding, it is also recognized that neither the Carrier or the Neutral commented on the fact that the Carrier altered the hearing transcript, which still must be considered fact absent any on-property information to the contrary. To conclude on this point, it is well-established that an incomplete and especially an ALTERED hearing transcript should be the death of any negative decision issued by a Carrier.
Because of these undisputed facts, BMWE indicated that allowing a charging officer to pass judgement on his own charges is in direct conflict with the basic fundamentals of due process which cannot be allowed to occur. This is not a mere technicality; it constitutes a denial of the Claimant's rights.
Again, the Carrier offered no argument in response to this claim. And, again, the first and only one to document any argument in this regard was the Neutral of this Board. On page 6 of the award, the Neutral offers the following argument:
It is quite apparent, based on this statement, that the Neutral is unconcerned how the Superintendent reached his decision because he ignores the facts identified in (A), (B) and (C) above. This is in direct conflict with countless awards that set forth the most basic of principles that such decisions MUST be based on the evidence of record developed at a fair and impartial investigation. There is absolutely no evidence that the superintendent developed his decision based on this principle and, in fact, it remains undisputed that he had not yet received the hearing transcript when he issued his September 5, 2000 letter. Further, one cannot substitute the subsequent "support" of the Carrier's Labor Relations Department for the decision that is required by the Parties' collective bargaining
agreement. Finally, as I indicated during our executive session, the Members of this Board have all been around long enough to know that it is unacceptable for the charging officer to render a decision on his own charges. This is so basic it is ridiculous for anyone to argue or ignore. Typical on this point is Award No. 13240 (Dorsey):
To conclude this member's opinion concerning the majority's decision regarding these flagrant procedural errors, allowing an incomplete and altered hearing transcript to be the basis for issuing discipline is completely unacceptable by any established standard. Further, it is equally unacceptable to allow a charging officer to pass judgement on his own charges. This is especially true in light of the fact he did not attend the investigation and did not have the benefit of reviewing the testimony and evidence contained in the hearing transcript. These procedural defects, separately, are more than what is necessary to overturn the Carrier's decision. Together, there should have been no hesitation by this Board to overturn the decision/discipline in this case.
It is absolutely necessary, in cases of this nature, to determine whether inaccurate information supplied by an employee is done intentionally or not. The parties agreed on this point and that the quantum of evidence required to prove a charge of dishonesty is higher than in cases involving other types of discipline. Without losing sight of this accepted principle, BMWE contended that the only basis upon which the Carrier could not agree that Claimant filled out the application honestly was its advice that it "seems unlikely."
Again, the Carrier offered no argument in response to this claim. Additionally, the Neutral of this Board, like the Carrier, did not cite any evidence in support of the Carrier's contention that the Claimant was dishonest. Hence, it remains that the only basis upon which the Carrier could not agree that Claimant Schneider filled out the application honestly, is that it "seems unlikely."
Clearly, this does not satisfy the standards of adequacy for proving a charge of dishonesty not to mention other types of discipline charges.
As admitted to by Human Resources Manager B. Williams, the information about the conviction is not information that would have dissuaded the Carrier from hiring the Claimant, therefore, the Carrier was prevented from terminating Claimant Schneider's employment relationship pursuant to Rule 20 (b).
Again, the Carrier offered no argument in response to this claim. And, again, the Neutral of this Board is the first and only one to document any argument in this regard. Here, the Neutral cites testimony that indicates Mr. Williams would not have hired the Claimant had he known that he had been convicted of a crime. The Neutral indicates this directly contradicts the testimony of Mr. Williams that the Employes cited. Hence, by his own admission, the Neutral indicates the Claimant would not have been hired based on the "contradictory" testimony of Mr. Williams. Obviously, such reasoning flies in the face of one of the most basic fundamentals of a fair and impartial disciplinary process that requires decisions to be based on direct and positive, i.e., not contradictory, evidence.
Notwithstanding, this Board Member does not necessarily agree that the two portions of Mr. Williams' testimony cited are contradictory. Instead the testimony cited by the Employes clarifies Mr. Williams' testimony indicating he would not have hired Claimant had he known that he had been convicted of a crime "unless he had something to show that that had been wiped off his record."
Hence, in either event, it is clear the majority of this Board is in serious error by concluding that Mr. Williams would not have hired the Claimant. Further, and as a result thereof, the Carrier was prevented from terminating Claimant Schneiders employment relationship pursuant to Rule 20 (b).
In summary, Issues (1) and (2) are significant procedural errors committed by the Carrier which would serve to nullify any Carrier decision. Issue (3) illustrates just how inadequate the evidence was in this case in connection with proving the charge of dishonesty. Finally, even if Issues (1), (2) and (3) did not exist, Issue (4) indicates there was no valid basis for terminating Claimant Schneiders employment relationship because of the prohibition contained in Rule 20 (b).
In conclusion, and with all due respect, the Neutral of this Board, or any Board, is not to create arguments or a basis for the Carrier's decision. This is especially true where there is no dispute between the parties on the facts of the matter. In effect, by the Neutral introducing new arguments into this case file to defend the Carrier's actions, the Neutral is no longer "neutral." Instead, the Neutral becomes an " advocate" for the Carrier which is completely at odds with the duties of the Neutral's position. Clearly, the Neutral has stepped over the line in this case. As a result thereof, this Board will have to be satisfied, on this occasion, with only two (2) Board Member signatures on the award because my signature, if affixed thereto, may be construed as an acceptance by the Employes that the decision is procedurally acceptable and appropriate, which is simply and emphatically not true.
CARRIER MEMBER'S RESPONSE TO THE ORGANIZATION'S DISSENT
TO
CASE NO. 195 OF PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5850
Even though the Organization's dissent does not contain anything really meaningful, it is vital that the Carrier address the Organization Member's remarks on the fourth page of the dissent where the Organization Member states, "Finally, as I indicated during our executive session, the Members of this Board have all been around long enough to know that is is
unacceptable for the charging officer to render a decision on his own charges. This is so basic it is ridiculous for anyone to argue or ignore." The dissent goes on to quote a Dorsey Award
(3-13240) as if all the Awards on the subject reflect Mr. Dorsey's opinion. The way the quote is written, the Organization member makes it appear as though the Carrier Member and the
Arbitrator agreed with his position. However, Third Division Award 13383, (Hall), reviews a similar argument. Mr. Hall held: