PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5905
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 26
and )
Award No. 22
ELGIN, JOLIET AND EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
D. D. Bartholomay, Employee Member
,1. F. Ingham
Carrier Member
Hearing Date: June 25, 2002
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
1. The discipline [forty(40) demerits and permanent disqualification as Super Truck
operator and roadway machine operator] assessed Super Truck Operator A. K.
Goodson for his alleged violation of Maintenance of Way Safety Rules 1.6, 1.11,
15.4, 15.16 and 15.20 in connection with the Super Truck striking an electrical
pole near the Middle Tower in Kirk Yard on November 27, 2001, was without
just and sufficient cause, excessive, arbitrary, and in violation of the Agreement
(System File GC-29-O1/UM-38-O1).
2. As a consequence of the violation referred to in Part (1) above, Super Truck
Operator A. K. Goodson shall now ". . . be compensated for all lost wages due to
his removal from service for this alleged incident. We also request that Mr.
Goodson's STO and RMO seniority be reinstated immediately and We request
that the demerits assessed be greatly reduced."
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 5905, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds
that Employee and Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the Railway Labor
Act, as amended; and, that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the parties
to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon and did participate therein.
On November 28, 2001, Carrier notified Claimant to report for an investigation on
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December 3, 2001. The investigation concerned Claimant's alleged violations of Safety Rules
1.6, 1.11, 15.4, 15.16 and 15.20 in connection with his alleged striking a utility pole while
operating the 442 Super Truck on November 27, 2001. Carrier withheld Claimant from service.
The hearing was held as scheduled. On December 4, 2001, Carrier advised Claimant that he had
been found guilty of the charge and assessed forty demerits, permanently disqualified as a Super
Truck Operator and Roadway Machine Operator and would not be compensated for the time held
out of service.
The record reflects that on November 27, 2001, Claimant was operating the 442 Super
Truck, in which three other employees were riding. Claimant dropped a book and some papers
on the floor of the truck. He picked them up, taking his eyes off the road, and struck the pole,
snapping it into two pieces. Claimant admitted his negligence. Thus, there is no question that
Carrier proved Claimant's guilt by substantial evidence.
The two key questions are whether Carrier violated the Agreement by withholding
Claimant from service and whether the punishment assessed was arbitrary, capricious or
excessive. Rule 57(a) provides, in relevant part, "If the offense is considered sufficiently serious,
the employee may be suspended pending the hearing and decision." There is no dispute that
Carrier considered Claimant's prior record in deciding to withhold Claimant from service
pending the hearing. The parties disagree over whether Rule 57(a) allows Carrier to consider an
employee's prior record as a basis for withholding the employee from service. The Organization
emphasizes that Rule 57(a) speaks of "the offense," and that this specific reference to the offense
under investigation limits Carrier to consideration of that offense, without regard to the
employee's prior record, in deciding to withhold the employee from service.
We agree with the Organization that the use of the definite article "the" indicates that a
decision to withhold an employee from service pending a hearing must be based on the
seriousness of the offense under investigation. However, that does not mean that an employee's
prior record will always be irrelevant in assessing the seriousness of the offense. To understand
why this is so, we must consider the probable purpose behind the provision allowing Carrier to
withhold anyone from service pending a hearing.
Rule 57(a) prohibits Carrier from disciplining any employee who has successfully
completed a sixty-day probationary period without first affording the employee a fair and
impartial hearing. However, Rule 57(a) recognizes that some offenses are sufficiently serious
that Carrier should not be required to run the risks involved in keeping the alleged offenders on
the job pending the hearing. For example, consider an employee charged with a major theft.
Although Carrier may not discipline that employee without first affording him a fair hearing to
determine whether the charge can be proven, Carrier need not run the risk of further theft if the
employee remains on the job pending the hearing. The employee is also protected because Rule
57(c) requires that if the charge is not sustained, the employee must be reinstated and made
whole for lost compensation.
Some offenses, such as theft and physical assault, are probably per se sufficiently serious
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to warrant withholding the alleged offender from service pending the hearing. Others, such as
tardiness, are probably per se insufficiently serious to warrant withholding the employee from
service pending the hearing. The instant case involves the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. We cannot say that negligence is per se sufficiently serious to warrant withholding an
employee from service pending the hearing. The employee's prior record may be a relevant
factor in evaluating the severity of the alleged offense.
For example, if an alleged act of negligence is charged against an employee of long
service with no prior record, the risk to Carrier of retaining the employee in service pending the
hearing is likely to be minimal. The offense, even if proved, will likely be an isolated incident
and not likely to be repeated. On the other hand, if the employee's record reflects a pattern of
similar acts in the past and the consequences of repetition could be severe, the offense may be
sufficiently serious to justify withholding the employee from service.
In the instant case, Claimant had accumulated fifty-five demerits at the time of the
incident. Fifteen of those demerits resulted from excessive absenteeism. They have no bearing
on the severity of an alleged offense of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Other matters on
Claimant's prior record, however, bear directly on the severity of the alleged offense in the
instant case. Other discipline assessed Claimant included incidents of a traffic violation, reckless
driving, and damaging a Carrier truck. These incidents place the instant charge in context. They
demonstrate that the instant charge was not an isolated incident but one which Carrier had
reasonable grounds to fear could be repeated if Claimant was not removed from service.
Furthermore, Carrier also had reasonable grounds to fear the consequences of a repeat incident.
Although no one was injured in the incident under investigation, if the power line supported by
the utility pole had fallen, people could have been injured severely or killed. Under the
circumstances, we find that the charge was sufficiently serious to warrant withholding Claimant
from service.
There remains the issue of penalty. The Organization points to examples of other
employees who engaged in similar acts of negligence and were not penalized as severely as the
Claimant. However, the record does not reflect that any of these other employees were similarly
situated to Claimant in terms of length of service and prior record. We are unable to conclude
that the penalty of forty demerits was arbitrary, capricious or excessive. Nor can we conclude, in
light of Claimant's record of prior driving offenses, that Carrier acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
excessively when it permanently disqualified Claimant from STO and RMO positions.
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AWARD
Claim denied.
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(L
J. F. Ingham
Carrier Member
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, October 30, 2002.
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Martin H. Malin, Chairman
D. . artholomay
Emp ee Member
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