Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
PAXIIES TO DISPUTE: and
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company
(Former St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Company)

STATEMENT OF CLAIM:



FTNDINC,S AND OPTNION:

Upon the whole record and all the evidence, the Board finds that the Carrier and Employees ("Parties") herein are respectively carrier and employees within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, and that this Board is duly constituted by agreement and has jurisdiction over the dispute herein.

The Claimant, Ms. Sheila D. White, was hired by the Carrier in its Maintenance of Way Department on June 23, 1997. She was working as a Maintenance of Way Traces on a construction gang in Memphis, Tennessee, in March, 2002.

On March 28, 2002, Roadmaster Greg T. Rickard wrote Ms. White a letter, reading in part:



The Parties' Agreement permits an employee to be disciplined without an investigation; however, if an investigation is timely requested, it must be afforded, and a precise statement of the charges must be provided in writing. Based on correspondence in the record, the Board presumes that an investigation was requested, although a copy of any such request is missing. An investiga tion was set for May 7, 2002,

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By agreement of the Parties, the investigation was postponed to, and held on, May 21, 2002. A transcript of testimony given in the investigation, together with evidence in the form of attached exhibits, is before this Board.

On May 30, 2002, the Carrier's Assistant Director Maintenance Production, Mr. Calvin J. Bray, advised the Claimannt:



The Organization appealed Mr. Bray's decision to Springfield Division General Manager F. IJ. Clilon, who stated that he felt the action taken by Mr. Rickard was correct and proper. He further stated that he found the Claimant in violation of Maintenance of Way Operating Rule (MWOR) 1.15, and Engineering Instruction (E.I.) 22.5. Those prescriptions read as follows:





Mr. Clifton's decision was appealed, in turn to the Carrier's highest designated officer, General Director - Labor Relations Dennis J. Merrell, who reaffirmed the decision rendered by Mr. Cliffon. The appeal was thereafter progressed to this Board for final disposition.

It is the Organization's position that the rules quoted above are overly vague and arbitrary. There is no dispute that the Claimant was absent horn work on March 27, 2002, but the. Organization argues that she called Foreman Joseph Mitchell to advise him of her absence, and attempted to notify Roadmaster Rickard, but he did not answer and his voice mail box wits full and would not accept her message.

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The Organization further argues that MWOR 1. 15 does not address the subject of laying off work, and the Claimant complied with E.I. 22.5, captioned "Absence From Duty Procedures." Additionally, the Organization states that Roadrnaster Rickard's "personal policy" for laying off duty is exactly opposite that prescribed in E.I. 22.5, and the Claimant should not be penalized for failure to comply with this persona! policy.

The Organization also objects that Mr. Rickard's "personal policy" was instituted solely because of the Clairnant, and he had never disciplined anyone else for absenteeism before the instant case, suggesting unfair, unequal treatment.

General Manager Ciilion responded that the record clearly shows that the Claimant did not report for work and did not call her Foreman, a violation of EA. 22.5 and MWOR 1.15. Ile added that the additional avenue Ibr laying off instituted by Mr. Rickard, i.e., permitting voice mail communication, albeit proscribed by E.I. 22_5, was not utilized by the Claimant.

Mr. Merrell, besides reaffirming the General Manager's response, pointed out that the Claimant is expected to report for duty at the appointed time and place, but she did not show up for work and she failed to alert anyone that she would be absent. Therefore, a formal reprimand is intended to make her aware of her responsibility to either be at work or render proper notification ofiher intended absence in the future.

The Board will first address the matter of Roadmaster Rickard's "personal policy" for laying off work, as it was characterized by the Organization. The Board notices that F.I. 22.5 states, "Leaving a voice mail message for the Roadmaster will not be considered contacting the proper authority." Mr. Rickard described his policy at several points in the transcript:



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The Board finds that this "personal policy" is actually less restrictive than the procedure set. forth in L.I. 22.5, and provides an easier method of reporting offduty. It happens that, according to the Claimant, she was unable to leave a voice mail message fbr the Roadmaster because his mail box would not accept more messages. But this did not leave heir in a more difficult position than she would have been under E.I. 22.5, which proscribes the .SS of voice mail for rnarking off.

It may well be true that no one: had previously been disciplined for absenteeism, but there is a first time for everything. The issue is not absenteeism, however, but the Claimant's alleged failure to advise anyone of her intended absence on March 27, 2002.

The Board does not find MWOR 1.15 and E.I. 22.5 to be "overly vague and arbitrary," as the Organization suggests. MWOR I .15 is similar to the rules found on any railroad (or any other industry, for that natter) governing any employee. No business could operate either economically or efficiently if employees were permitted to absent themselves at any time without ,any notice or permission. MWOR 1.15 requires employees to report for duty on tirnc, and F.L 22.5 prescribes the procedure for marking off; when one must necessarily be absent.

When the Claimant found she was unable to leave a voice mail message for Roadmaster Rickard, she had an alternative recourse, that prescribed in E.I. 22.5: "If for some reason you need to be absent; it will be necessary that you pcn-sonally contact your Assistant Roadmaster or Foreman to discuss the matter with them." Here, the testimony of the Claimant and Track Foreman Mitchell diverge. The Claimant testified:

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But Mr. Mitchell testified:









On cross examination, neither the Claimant's representative, nor herself, took the opportunity to search for further truth or question the accuracy of Mr. Mitchell':; statement, above.

It is plausible that Mr. Rickard's voice mail box was filled, and no contravening evidence or testimony appears in the record. But the Board is unable to resolve the disaccord between the testimony of the Claimant and that of Mr. Mitcholl with respect to whether the Claimant called him to report her intended absence, as she asserted she did. It thus becomes a question of credibility. A:: this Board said in its Award No. 20:



The Board finds there; was compliance with Discipline Rule 9 1 of the Parties' Agreement, substantial evidence was adduced at the investigation to prove the charges made, ,and the discipline assessed, a formal reprimand, is not excessive. The claim is denied.

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