PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 6302
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 122
and )
Award No. 110
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
D: D. Bartholomay, Employee Member
D. A. Ring, Carrier Member
Hearing Date: June 4, 2007
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
The Organization requested that discipline be stricken from Claimant Mark A. Roth's
personal record and that he be returned to his prior status under Behavior Modification.
Also, that he be made whole as if there had been no discipline issued and no suspension
enforced. That Mr. Roth be paid for all hours that he would have worked absent the
suspension, including overtime and be compensated for his time not paid on the day of
the hearing on August 16, 2006
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 6302 upon the whole record and all of the evidence, finds and
holds that Employee and Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended; and, that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the
parties to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon and did participate therein.
By letter dated June 30, 2006, Carrier notified Claimant that he allegedly failed to have a
proper job briefing on June 23, 2006, which resulted in the DC-30 rail test attempting to set on
the main track in front of the UP 5469 in the vicinity of MP 746 on the Rawlins Subdivision.
The letter proposed discipline at UPGRADE Level 3 and gave Claimant the option of exercising
his right to a formal hearing or participating in the Behavior Modification Program. Claimant
opted for a formal hearing.
By letter dated July 17, 2006, Claimant was notified to report for a formal investigation
on July 26, 2006 The notice repeated the charge contained in the June 30, 2006, letter. The
hearing was postponed to and held on August 16, 2006. On August 25, 2006, Claimant was
advised that he had been found guilty of the charge and had been assessed discipline at Level 3, a
five-day suspension.
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Carrier contends that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the claim because the claim failed
to specify any Agreement rule claimed to have been violated. Carrier is correct that no
Agreement rule was expressly cited in the claim or otherwise during handling on the property.
The claim alleged that Claimant was denied a fair hearing, that Carrier failed to prove the charge
and that the penalty imposed was excessive. That was the claim handled on the property. Both
parties engaged on the claim as they would any other claim that discipline violated the
Agreement's discipline sole, i.e. Rule 48. There is no question that although the claim did not
expressly cite Rule 48, the parties understood that Rule 48 was at issue. Carrier's argument
elevated form over substance to a level that we do not believe is contemplated within the
Agreement.
Carrier has cited a number of awards in support of its position that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. We see no need to discuss them in detail. It is sufficient to observe that none of the
awards cited by Carrier approximates the situation before us, i.e., a claim appealing discipline
that was processed on the property in the same mamler as any other claim appealing discipline,
analyzed in accordance with the Agreement's discipline rule and where to dismiss the claim for
failure to expressly cite the Rule number would serve no purpose other than to elevate form over
substance. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the claim.
The critical issue is whether Carrier proved the charge by substantial evidence. The
record reflects that on June 23, 2006, Claimant was working as Assistant Foreman on Gang
5497. Claimant's gang was working with the crew of Detector Car 30. They were to test track
up to Bitter Creek. They were advised to wait for two freight trains to pass and to obtain track
after train UP 5469 had passed. The Welding Foreman had driven to the location of the Detector
Car for a job briefing because he could not understand a radio transmission. The ARASA
Supervisor with the Detector Car advised the Welding Foreman that they were to wait until the
trains passed and then to get a track permit to conduct their testing. They decided that the
Welding Foreman would move his car closer to the Interstate while they were waiting and the
Detector Car crew would follow and bring him back to the crossing. As they were returning to
the crossing, they observed a train pass but could not see its number. The ARASA Supervisor
radioed Claimant. The contents of their conversation are in dispute and the resolution of that
dispute determines whether Carrier proved the charge by substantial evidence.
The ARASA Supervisor testified that he asked Claimant which train had passed and
Claimant replied that it was the UP 5469 and the Supervisor reconfirmed this with Claimant.
Claimant testified that the Supervisor asked him which train they were waiting on and Claimant
told himUP 5469.
The ARASA Supervisor advised the Welding Foreman that the UP 5469 had passed and
the Welding Foreman obtained a track permit. In fact, the train that had passed was not the UP
5469. As the Detector Car gang was setting the Detector Car on the main track, they noticed a
headlight about two miles away. Fortunately, they were able to get clear of the track before the
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UP 5469 passed by them.
The Organization's attack on the evidence against Claimant proceeds along two lines.
First, it argues that Claimant's version of the conversation is the more credible one, i.e. that the
ARASA Supervisor did not in fact ask Claimant which train had passed. Carrier, however,
points out that the Welding Foreman corroborated the ARASA Supervisor's version as to what
the Supervisor asked Claimant and the Supervisor's report of Claimant's response. Thus,
substantial evidence supports the finding on the property that the Supervisor in fact asked
Claimant what train had just passed. However, this does not necessarily mean that Carrier
proved the charge by substantial evidence.
The Organization's stronger argument is that regardless of whether the ARASA
Supervisor asked Claimant which train had passed, because of problems with radio transmission,
Claimant understood the ARASA Supervisor to have asked which train they were waiting on and
Claimant accurately replied UP 5469. In this regard, the Welding Supervisor's corroboration of
the ARASA Supervisor's testimony cannot impeach Claimant's claim to have heard a different
question from what the ARASA Supervisor actually asked.
There are two reasonable conclusions that could be drawn from the evidence. Either
Claimant misheard the ARASA Supervisor's question because of static or other problems with
the radio transmission, or Claimant's testimony that he heard the ARASA Supervisor ask which
train they were waiting on was not credible. As an appellate body that did not observe the
witnesses, particularly that did not observe Claimant's demeanor while testifying, we are in a
much poorer position than the hearing officer to determine which of these two reasonable
interpretations of the evidence is more likely to be accurate. Therefore, we defer to the
determination made on the property. The determination on the property that Claimant's
testimony was not sufficiently credible to warrant a finding that Claimant actually heard an
inquiry as to which train they were waiting on, rather than an inquiry as to which train had just
passed, was reasonable. Accordingly, we hold that Carrier proved the charge by substantial
evidence.
AWARD
Claim denied.
Martin H. Malin, Chairman
D. A. Rin D. arthOloma
Carrier Member'
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Dated at Chicago, Illinois, December 6, 2007
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