PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 6302
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 148
and )
Award No. 143
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
T. W. Kreke, Employee Member
D. A. Ring, Carrier Member
Hearing Date: June 18, 2008
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
(1) The dismissal of Mr. John W. Lamons for violation of Rule 48(k) in connection
with failing to appear to work or call for authorization to be absent from work
between the dates of May 7 and 22, 2007 is unjust, unwarranted and in violation
of the Agreement (System File J-0748U-26011484564).
(2) As a consequence of the violation outlined in Part (1) above, we request that Mr.
Lamons be immediately returned to service with all rights restored unimpaired
and that he be compensated for all hours he has been deprived of working since he
has been released for work by his physician.
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 6302 upon the whole record and all of the evidence, finds and
holds that Employee and Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended; and, that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the
parties to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon and did participate therein.
On May 22, 2007, Carrier notified Claimant that he had failed to appear for work or call
for authorization to be absent between May 7, 2007 and May 22, 2007. Accordingly, Carrier
notified Claimant that his seniority had been forfeited in accordance with Rule 48(k) of the
Agreement. Rule 48(k) provides, in relevant part:
Employees absenting themselves from their assignment for five (5) consecutive working
days without proper authority shall be considered as voluntarily forfeiting their seniority
PLB No. 6302
Award 143
rights and employment relationship, unless justifiable reason is shown as to why proper
authority was not obtained.
The Organization contends that Claimant complied with Rule 48(k) because he
demonstrated that he was absent due to back and knee problems and was under a doctor's care
and because he called the Assistant Foreman/Timekeeper and reported that he was off sick in
accordance with instructions allegedly given to him by his Foreman. Carrier responds that the
medical documentation covers only the period May 5 - May 9, 2007, and therefore does not
justify the entire period Claimant was absent. Carrier further responds that Claimant's calls to
the Assistant Foreman did not protect his seniority as the Assistant Foreman has no authority to
give Claimant permission to be absent or to grant him a medical leave of absence.
We are unable to agree with Carrier's contention that the medical documentation failed to
account for the entire period of absence in dispute. The doctor's statement, dated May 15, 2007,
did reflect initial treatment on May 4 and the date of last appointment as May 9. However, it also
stated, "I am unable to release this patient. I anticipate significant clinical improvement by
6/4/07. Next appointment 6/4/07." We conclude that the evidence does support that Claimant
was medically unable to work and under doctor's care throughout the period in dispute.
The Organization submitted copies of Claimant's phone records showing numerous calls
to the Assistant Foreman's cell phone purportedly to report absences in 2007. On his phone
record of May 7, 2007, Claimant wrote the following statement:
May 7 - 5:33 AM - before work on Monday. A call Whitney Maws, assistant foremans
(sic) cell phone. I was told to call Whitney, if I miss work, because he takes care of the
timekeeping for payrolls (and he needs to know what to put down; vacation, personal day,
etc.)
Claimant may have been advised by his Foreman to call the Assistant Foreman to report
the absence for timekeeping purposes but such advise did not mean that Claimant was excused
from contacting the Foreman or other appropriate authority to secure approval for his medical
leave of absence. Thus, technically, Claimant was absent without authority and under the literal
language of Rule 48(k), Carrier acted properly in terminating Claimant's seniority.
However, it is well-established that although "Rule 48(k) is self-executing[,] . . . when
faced with a claimant who had not followed through to the extent that he should have but who
also had not completely abandoned his job, [Boards have] recognized that confusion in
communication contributing to the claimant's predicament can mitigate against the harshness
resulting from a literal application of self executing rules calling for forfeiture of seniority.
NRAB, Third Division Award No. 31535, at 4;
see also
NRAB Third Division Award No.
36038.
In the instant case, it is clear that Claimant was under a doctor's care and medically
2
PL13 No. &302
Award 143
unable to work during the period of his absence. It is also clear that Claimant did contact the
Assistant Foreman in accordance with prior instructions from his Foreman. Although Claimant's
calling the Assistant Foreman did not relieve him of the responsibility of also contacting his
Foreman to obtain a leave of absence, we conclude that the circumstances of this case warrant
mitigating the harshness of a literal application of Rule 48(k). Accordingly, in line with
established precedent on this property, we shall award that Claimant be reinstated to service with
seniority unimpaired but without compensation for time out of service.
AWARD
Claim sustained in accordance with the Findings.
ORDER
The Board having determined that an award favorable to Claimant be issued, Carrier is
ordered to implement the award within thirty days from the date two members affix their
signatures hereto
Martin H. Malin, Chairman
D. A. Ring T.IW. Kre , m toyee Member
Carrier Mmber Employee Member
f
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, October 30, 2008
3
Page 4
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 6302
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 148
and )
Award No. 143
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
T. W. Kreke, Employee Member
D. A. Ring, Carrier Member
Interpretation No. I
Claimant was dismissed pursuant to Rule 48(k) for being absent from May 7, 2007 to
May 22, 2007, without authority. We sustained the claim in part, awarding that "Claimant be
reinstated to service with seniority unimpaired but without compensation for time out of service."
The Organization returns to this Board seeking an interpretation of our Award. Specifically, the
Organization asks that we interpret the Award and hold that Claimant is entitled to the retroactive
portion of the general wage increases provided for in the July 1, 2007, mediated agreement.
Carrier contends that the request for interpretation was improper. In Carrier's view,
Claimant should have filed a claim under the July 1, 2007 agreement, not sought an interpretation
of our Award. Even if the dispute might properly be the subject of a request for interpretation,
Carrier argues, it is untimely because it was not filed within sixty days of the Award. Finally,
Carrier contends that under our Award and Side Letter No. 2 to the July 1, 2007 agreement,
Claimant is not entitled to the retroactive wage increases. We shall address each argument in
turn.
Propriety of the Request for Interpretation
Carrier contends that the Organization is arguing that Claimant was entitled to the
retroactive portion of the general wage increases for the period he worked until his removal from
service on May 22, 2007. In Carrier's view, the Organization is claiming that by not paying the
retroactive wage increases to Claimant, Carrier breached the July 1, 2007 agreement. Carrier
urges that the appropriate way to raise this issue was to file a claim under the July 1, 2007
agreement, not to seek an interpretation from this Board. In essence, Carrier maintains that the
request for interpretation is outside this Board's authority.
Side Letter No. 2 provides, in relevant part:
Interpretation No. 1 PL13 No. 6302
Page 5 Award 143
It is understood that the retroactive portion of those wage increases shall be applied only
to employes who have an employment relationship with a carrier on the date of this
Agreement or who retired or died subsequent to June 30, 2005.
Carrier terminated Claimant's employment based on Rule 48(k) on May 22, 2007, i.e.
before the date of the July 1, 2007 agreement. The question framed by the Organization's
request for interpretation is whether the Award which reinstated Claimant with seniority
unimpaired but without compensation for time out of service affected his employment status on
July 1, 2007, such that he would be entitled to the retroactive portion of the general wage
increases. Carrier agrees that if the Award had reinstated Claimant with full back pay, Claimant
would have been entitled to the retroactive wage increases. Claimant's entitlement to the
retroactive wage increases turns on the meaning of our Award, specifically the meaning of
Claimant's reinstatement "with seniority unimpaired." Because the dispute turns on the meaning
of Award No. 143, we conclude that it is a proper matter for a request for interpretation of the
Award.'
Timeliness of the Request for Interpretation
The Neutral Chair of the Board signed Award No. 143 on October 30, 2008. The Carrier
and Employee Members of the Board signed the Award on November 12, 2008. The request for
interpretation came in a letter from the Vice Chairman to the Carrier Member of the Board dated
March 24, 2009. Relying on Rule 49(a)(1), Carrier contends that the request for interpretation
was untimely because it was not filed within sixty days of the date that the Carrier and Employee
Members signed the Award.
Rule 49(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
All claims or grievances must be presented in writing by or on behalf of the employee
involved, to the officer of the carrier authorized to receive same, within sixty (60) days
from the date of the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is based. The date a
claim is presented is the date the claim is sent, as evidenced by postmark when the U.S.
Mail service is utilized.
On its face, Rule 49(a)(1) applies to "claims or grievances," not a request for
interpretation of an Award. A request for interpretation is governed by the Agreement that
created the Board. That Agreement provides in paragraph 11:
The Board hereby established shall continue in existence until it has disposed of the
disputes submitted to it under this Agreement after which it will cease to exist. In case a
dispute arises involving an interpretation or application of an award, the Board, upon
'Whether the dispute could also have been raised by filing a claim under the July 1, 2007 agreement is not
before this Board.
2
Interpretation No. 1 PL13 No. 6302
Page 6 Award 143
request of either party, shall interpret the award in light of the dispute. If the Board has
ceased to exist, the request for an interpretation must be made within ninety (90) days of
the date of the award and the Board will convene for the sole purpose of rendering an
interpretation.
Thus, the only express time limit contained in the Agreement for requests for
interpretation applies only when the Board has ceased to exist. PL13 6302 continues to exist so
the ninety day limit does not apply. It might be argued that there is an implied limit that requests
for interpretation be filed within a reasonable period of time. We need not decide whether the
Agreement contains such an implied time limit because there is no showing that the Organization
waited beyond a reasonable time to file its request. Accordingly, we conclude that the request is
timely and properly before us.
The Merits of the Request for Interpretation
The Organization contends that because the Award reinstated Claimant with seniority
unimpaired, he may no longer be considered as in a dismissed status on July 1, 2007, and
therefore is entitled to the retroactive portion of the general wage increases. In essence, the
Organization urges that the Award converted Claimant's dismissal to a lengthy suspension.
Although Claimant is not entitled to the retroactive wage increases for the period he was
effectively suspended, the Organization urges he is entitled to retroactive wage increases for the
period he worked prior to being withheld from service.
Carrier maintains that our Award merely restored Claimant's seniority upon his
reinstatement but did not change his status as of July 1, 2007. In Carrier's view, under Side
Letter No. 2, to receive retroactive wage increases, Claimant had to have had an employment
relationship with Carrier as of July 1, 2007, something he clearly lacked. Our Award did not
change that. Carrier concludes that Claimant is not entitled to any retroactive wage increases.
Rule 48(k) provides, in relevant part:
Employees absenting themselves from their assignment for five (5) consecutive working
days without proper authority shall be considered as voluntarily forfeiting their seniority
rights and employment relationship, unless justifiable reason is shown as to why proper
authority was not obtained.
In the case before us, the Organization argued that Claimant complied with Rule 48(k)
because he established that his absence was due to back and knee problems for which he was
under a doctor's care and because he called the Assistant Foreman/Timekeeper and advised that
he was off sick. We rejected those arguments. We observed that Rule 48(k) required that
Claimant and the Organization establish justifiable reason not for the absence but for the failure
to obtain proper authority. Claimant's medical condition may have prevented him from working
but there was no showing that it prevented him from calling in and obtaining authority for his
absence. We further found that although Claimant's Foreman may have advised him to call the
3
'Interpretation No. 1 PLB No. 6302
Page 7 Award 143
Assistant Foreman for timekeeping purposes, "such advise did not mean that Claimant was
excused from contacting the Foreman or other appropriate authority to secure approval for his
medical leave of absence." We concluded that "technically, Claimant was absent without
authority and under the literal language of Rule 48(k), Carrier acted properly in terminating
Claimant's seniority."
However, we found a significant gloss on the literal language of Rule 48(k) in
precedential authority on the property. Specifically, we observed that although Rule 48(k) was
self-executing, several on-property Awards had held that in appropriate circumstances, a Board
has authority to mitigate the harsh effects of a literal application of the Rule. We observed that
Claimant did not abandon his job, that he was medically unable to work and that he did contact
the Assistant Foreman to report his absences. We concluded that "the circumstances of this case
warrant mitigating the harshness of a literal application of Rule 48(k). Accordingly, in line with
established precedent on this property, we shall award that Claimant be reinstated to service with
seniority unimpaired but without compensation for time out of service."
This is not a case where Carrier dismissed an employee for misconduct and the Board
found that although Carrier proved the misconduct, dismissal was arbitrary, capricious or
excessive. In such a case, it is arguable that an award reinstating a claimant with seniority
unimpaired but without compensation converts the dismissal to a lengthy suspension. We
express no view as to the validity of such an argument. What is clear in the case before us is that
under the literal language of Rule 48(k), Claimant's seniority was properly terminated on May
22, 2007. Thus, under the literal language of Rule 48(k), Claimant did not have an employment
relationship with Carrier on July 1, 2007. However, we found, consistent with established
precedent on this property, that we had authority to mitigate the harsh effects of a literal
application of Rule 48(k) and that the circumstances presented warranted such mitigation. In
accordance with this established arbitral gloss on Rule 48(k), we awarded reinstatement without
monetary compensation. Our words "with seniority unimpaired" addressed Claimant's status
upon reinstatement, something that under our Order had to occur within thirty days of November
12, 2008, but did not change Claimant's status as of July 1, 2007. Accordingly, we conclude that
Claimant is not entitled to the retroactive portion of the general wage increases under the July 1,
2007 agreement.
Martin H. Malin, Chairman
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, June 27, 2009
4