PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 6402
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 134
and )
Award No. I 1 I
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
T. W. Kreke, Employee Member
B. W. Hanquist, Carrier Member
Hearing Date: December 17, 2008
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
1. The dismissal of Trackman J. C. Hinojosa for violation of GCOR Rule 1.6(4)
(Conduct - Dishonest) in connection with alleged falsification of an injury report
is unjust, unwarranted and in violation of the Agreement (System File MW-07
172/1493592 MPR).
2. As a consequence of the violation outlined in Part (1) above, we are now
requesting that the charges be dropped and that Mr. Hinojosa have his personal
record cleared of all charges as addressed in the first paragraph of this letter. Also
that he be reinstated with all back pay, seniority unimpaired and all other rights
due to him by the collective bargaining agreement. This is in addition to any and
all compensation that the Claimant may have already received.
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 6402 upon the whole record and all of the evidence, finds and
holds that Employee and Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended; and, that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the
parties to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon and did participate therein.
On November 14, 2007, Claimant was notified to report for a formal investigation on
November 20, 2007, concerning charges that "while employed as a Trackman on Gang No. 9103,
at or near Osawatomie, Kansas, at approximately 12:30 p.m. , on November 4, 2007, you were
allegedly dishonest when you falsified an injury report you submitted to Supervisor J. D. Lanies,
on November 4, 2007, claiming you were injured on October 17, 2007, in Villa Grove, Illinois.
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Award I I I
The hearing was held as scheduled. On December 6, 2007, Claimant was advised that he had
been found guilty of the charge and had been dismissed from service.
The Organization has raised two procedural arguments. First, it contends that the Notice
was defective because it alleged that Claimant falsified an injury report on November 4, 2007,
whereas the undisputed evidence is that Claimant completed the report on November 3. The
discrepancy was explained at the hearing. The morning of November 3, 2007, Claimant required
medical attention for his back. Because his supervisor, W. D. Martin, was unavailable, Claimant
notified his foreman. The foreman contacted Supervisor Martin who advised Claimant and the
foreman to contact Supervisor Lanies who was about 90 miles away from Claimant, closer than
Supervisor Martin. Laines took Claimant for medical attention and subsequently completed the
injury report with Claimant. However, Laines did not enter the report into Carrier's computer
system until November 4, resulting in the use of the November 4 date in the Notice. We do not
find the one day discrepancy in the Notice fatal to Carrier's case. There is no question that
Claimant was aware of the basis for the charges and came prepared to defend against them. The
discrepancy in the dates was not intentional and did not prejudice Claimant's defense in any way.
It provides no basis for disturbing the discipline.
Second, the Organization contends that Carrier did not properly deny the claim at the first
level appeal. The Organization quotes the Manager Labor Relations' decision as stating, "Based
on the evidence, I have found that the Carrier has met its burden and has produced substantial
evidence to demonstrate that Claimant did fail to report a personal injury in a timely manner."
The Organization urges that Claimant was never charged with failing to report a personal injury
in a timely manner. Therefore, in the Organization's view, the denial of the claim failed to
provide appropriate reasons or relied on matters outside the scope of the original charge. In
either case, the denial was defective and requires that the claim be sustained.
We are unable to agree with the Organization's position. The Organization has quoted a
single sentence from the first level appeal denial completely out of context. In the paragraph
preceding that sentence, the Manager Labor Relations wrote, "The bottom line is that we have an
individual who reports that he incurred an injury on approximately October 17, 2007 yet never
indicated to the appropriate Carrier management that he allegedly incurred the personal injury ...
. It is readily apparent throughout the investigation testimony that Claimant Hinojosa did not
incur an on-duty injury and is attempting to falsify an alleged incident. If Claimant had incurred
a personal injury, he would have reported it to Carrier management immediately, not seventeen
(17) days after the alleged injury occurrence." Thus, it is clear that the Manager Labor Relations
cited the proof of late reporting not as a violation in and of itself, but as the basis for inferring
Claimant's falsifcation of his injury claim, which was the exact charge on which Claimant's
dismissal was based.
The critical issue is whether Carrier proved the charge by substantial evidence. Carrier's
case that Claimant falsified his claim of on-duty injury is based on inferences drawn from
Claimant's failure to report the injury for more than two weeks after it allegedly occurred and on
Claimant's report of an injury occurring at a location where Claimant was not working on the
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date that he alleged it occurred. Both bases for the inferences were hotly contested at the hearing.
With respect to the late reporting, Claimant testified that he reported the injury the day it
happened to the Assistant Foreman. Claimant explained that Supervisor Martin was not
available and the Foreman was on vacation, so he reported to the highest ranking individual who
was present. Supervisor Martin testified he asked the Assistant Foreman if Claimant had
reported the injury and the Assistant Foreman had no recollection of such a report. The Assistant
Foreman was not called as a witness. Thus, an inference from alleged late reporting depends on
the comparative credibility of Claimant's direct testimony that he reported the injury to the
Assistant Foreman against Supervisor Martin's hearsay testimony as to what the Assistant
Foreman told him.
Claimant's injury report claimed that he was injured flipping plates on October 17, 2007,
at Villa Grove, Illinois on the Pana Subdivision. In fact, Claimant's gang worked on the Pana
Subdivision in September but as of October 1, they were working on the Lost Springs
Subdivision in Kansas. It is this discrepancy, noticed by Supervisor Martin, that led to the charge
against Claimant and his removal from service pending investigation.
At the investigation, Claimant testified that the injury occurred on October 16, 2007, at
Peabody, Kansas. He explained the discrepancy on the injury report as an honest mistake. He
testified that on November 3, when he completed the report with Supervisor Lanies, he was
under a good deal of stress from the increased back pain he was experiencing and from ethnic
harassment that he had reported the previous day on Carrier's EEO Hotline. Claimant explained
that his gang had moved around a good deal and, in trying to recall where he was when the injury
occurred, he noticed Lanies' cap which .said Villa Grove, Illinois, remembered working at Villa
Grove on the Pana Subdivision and concluded that that was the location where he had been in
October. He further explained that he remembered the date incorrectly because he mistakenly
remembered the date that his gang returned for the second compressed half of the month.'
Claimant testified that he first realized his errors on November 14, when a Claims Agent
telephoned him. Claimant further testified that he did not at that time contact Supervisor Martin
to correct his injury report because the Claims Agent told him the matter would be transferred to
a claims agent who handled claims from the Peabody, Kansas area and that the new claims agent
would contact Claimant. In light of Claimant's testimony, the Hearing Officer quite
appropriately attempted to contact the Claims Agent to take his testimony by telephone. The
Hearing Officer reported that the Claims Agent was unable to testify by phone but admitted a
written statement from the Claims Agent dated November 15. 2007. The written statement
reported that in their November 14 telephone conversation, Claimant told the Claims Agent that
his injury report was a big mistake and that the injury had actually occurred on November 3 in
Peabody, Kansas. The written statement further averred that the Claims Agent advised Claimant
'We note that Lanies testified before Claimant did and that neither party sought to recall him to ask if he
owned a hat that said Villa Grove, Illinois on it and, if so, if he was wearing it on November 3.
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to contact his Supervisor right away to correct the injury report.
Claimant's representative objected to the admission of the written statement into evidence
and insisted that the Claims Agent testify so that he could be cross-examined. The Hearing
Officer overruled the objection and admitted the written statement, The Hearing Officer gave no
rationale for his ruling and we are unable to discern any justification for the ruling. If the Claims
Agent was not available to testify by telephone at that moment, we see no reason why the
Hearing Officer could not have recessed the hearing and reconvened it at a time that the Claims
Agent was available. Instead, determination of what occurred during Claimant's telephone
conversation with the Claims Agent, a matter that was extremely significant in determining
whether Claimant was honestly mistaken when he reported that the alleged injury occurred on
October 17 at Villa Grove, Illinois, was left to evaluating the credibility of Claimant's live
testimony against the hearsay written statement of the Claims Agent.
Thus, both factual bases for the inference of Claimant's dishonest intent-his late
reporting and his errors in reporting- required a finding that Claimant's live testimony was less
credible than the contrary hearsay evidence - Martin's testimony as to what the Assistant
Foreman told him and the written statement from the Claims Agent. It is conceivable that a
finder of fact who observed the witnesses testify might conclude that Claimant's testimony was
so lacking in credibility that the contrary hearsay evidence was entitled to greater weight.
However, that is not what occurred in the instant case. The Hearing Officer who observed the
witnesses testify made no such finding. Rather, it was the Director Track Programs, who was not
present at the investigation and consequently did not observe the witnesses testify, who found
Claimant guilty and imposed discipline. We are unable to see how the DTP, without observing
the witnesses testify, could conclude that the hearsay evidence was entitled to greater weight than
Claimant's live testimony. Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that Carrier failed to
prove Claimant's dishonest intent by substantial evidence.
Although Carrier failed to prove Claimant's dishonesty, there is no dispute that the injury
report Claimant filed was significantly inaccurate. It is also apparent that the inaccuracies
resulted from Claimant's negligence in completing the report. Such negligence warrants
significant discipline, although it does not warrant dismissal. Accordingly, we award that Carrier
shall reinstate Claimant to service with seniority unimpaired but without compensation for time
out of service.
AWARD
Claim sustained in accordance with the Findings.
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ORDER
The Board having determined that an award favorable to Claimant be issued, Carrier is
ordered to implement the award within thirty days from the date two members affix their
signatures hereto
B. W. Hanquist
Carrier Member
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, January 31, 2009
lalin, Chairman
T. . Kreke
Employee Member