PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 6402
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES )
Case No. 139
and )
)Award No. 115
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
T. W. Kreke, Employee Member
B. W. Hanquist, Carrier Member
Hearing Date: December 17, 2008
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
1. The dismissal of Trackman James E. Brown, 3r. for violation of Rule 1.6(4)
(Conduct - Dishonest) in connection with the allegation that he allegedly falsified
an injury on September 7, 2007, is unjust, unwarranted, based on unproven
charges and in violation of the Agreement (System File MW-T07-31/1493809
MPR).
2. As a consequence of the violation outlined in Part (1) above, it is requested that
Mr. Brown be returned to service with all his seniority rights and vacation rights
restored unimpaired, and that the level against him be dismissed in its entirety.
Mr. Brown was displaced at the time he was suspended from service; therefore the
Organization requests that he be given a sufficient number of days to successfully
place himself in a position for which he is qualified. The Organization also
requests that Mr. Brown be compensated for all lost wages from the date he was
pulled from service until the date he is returned.
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 6402 upon the whole record and all of the evidence, finds and
holds that Employee and Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended; and, that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the
patties to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon and did participate therein.
On September 13, 2007, Claimant was notified to report for a formal investigation on
October 2, 2007, concerning his alleged dishonesty when, on September 7, 2007, he claimed to
have suffered a personal injury. Following several postponements, the hearing was held on
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Award 115
October 25, 2007. On November 8, 2007, Claimant was advised that he had been found guilty of
the charge and had been dismissed from service.
The Organization has raised several procedural objections. These objections are
controlled by our ruling in Case No. 127, Award
No. 109.
As in Case
No.
127, the Organization
contends that Carrier violated Rule 21 of the Agreement by postponing the hearing without the
concurrence of Claimant's representative and by holding the hearing outside the Rule 21 time
limits. Rule 21(a)(I) provides that "Carrier will make every effort to schedule and hold a formal
investigation under this rule within thirty (30) calendar days from date of the occurrence to be
investigated except as herein provided or from the date the Carrier has knowledge of the
occurrence to be investigated." Rule 21(i) provides that if an employee is suspended pending
investigation, "the Carrier will make every effort to schedule and hold a formal investigation
within twenty (20) calendar days of the date the employee is suspended, and render a transcript
and decision within twenty (20) calendar days following the date the hearing is concluded."
As we observed in Award
No. 109,
the Agreement does not mandate that the hearing be
held within the specified time frame. It requires that Carrier "make every effort" to schedule the
hearing within the specified time frame. In the instant case, the hearing initially was scheduled
for October 2, 2007, which was within the time frame specified in the Agreement, i.e. within
thirty days of the alleged incident and within twenty days of the date Claimant was withheld from
service. The investigation was postponed to October 16, postponed again to October 23 and
postponed again to October 25. The final postponement is not at issue as it occurred at the
request of Claimant and his representative. The postponement to October 16 occurred because
the investigating officer was not available and the postponement to October 23 occurred because
a key witness, the Engineering Supervisor, was not available. There is no evidence that the
postponements were made for any reason other than necessity and no evidence of any further
effort that Carrier could have undertaken to conduct the hearing within the thirty and twenty day
time frames. There is also no evidence that the delay prejudiced Claimant's ability to present a
defense. Accordingly, we conclude, as in Award No.
109,
that there was no violation of Rules
21(a)(1) or 21(i).
Rule 21(b) provides for postponements upon "mutual agreement between the Carrier and
the employee or his representative." In the instant case, no such agreement was obtained for the
postponements to October 16 and 23. However, as we held in Award
No. 109,
the effect of
Carrier's failure to obtain agreement for a postponement is to deprive Carrier of the ability to rely
on the postponement to fulfill its contractual obligation of conducting the hearing in a timely
manner. It does not provide a basis for disturbing the discipline if, independently of a mutually
agreed to postponement, Carrier has complied with Rule 21's provisions for timely scheduling.
In the instant case, as we held above, Carrier did make every effort to schedule the hearing within
the Rule's time lines. Consequently, as in Award No. 109, the failure to obtain agreement for the
postponements does not invalidate due discipline.
On September 7, 2007, Claimant and the claimant in Case No. 127 were passengers in a
Carrier van driven by the Switch Gang Foreman. The van was waiting to make a left turn into a
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Award 115
store parking lot when another vehicle came out of the parking lot and tried to go around the van
but struck it in what witnesses described as a minor accident. 'The other vehicle scraped the rear
of the van.
Claimant claimed to have been injured in the accident and completed a personal injury
report. At issue is whether Carrier proved by substantial evidence that Claimant falsified the
report.
Supporting the Organization's position that Claimant was in fact injured, was the report
from the physician who examined Claimant after the accident and diagnosed, "sprain lumbar
region, spasm of muscle, contusion of knee." On the other hand, the Foreman testified that
immediately after the accident he asked if anyone in the van was hurt and Claimant indicated that
he was not hurt. About ten minutes later, the Engineering Supervisor arrived on the scene and
Claimant again indicated that he was not hurt. Claimant denied telling them that he was not hurt,
but maintained that he only said that he was not "busted up" or bleeding. Of course, as an
appellate body that does not observe the witnesses testify, we defer to the credibility
determinations made on the property as long as they are reasonable. In the instant case, we defer
to the decision made on the property to credit the testimony of the Foreman and Engineering
Supervisor over the testimony of the Claimant.
Additionally, a Trackman testified that he was in the van after the accident and overheard
the claimant from Case No. 127 on the phone with his union representative and then with his
lawyer. The Trackman testified that he observed Claimant and the claimant from Case No. 127
periodically laughing about the situation and that they did not appear to be hurt or to be taking
the accident seriously.
An expert in accident reconstruction retained by Carrier testified that the impact
generated insufficient force to transfer any energy to the occupants of the van. In the expert's
opinion, it was not possible for any of the van's occupants to have been injured as a result of the
collision.
As we observed in Award No. 109, "Our review is limited to a determination of whether
the factual findings made on the property are supported by substantial evidence, that is whether a
reasonable person could have come to the same factual conclusions." As in Award No. 109, the
medical report supports a finding that Claimant acted honestly in claiming an on-duty injury.
However, the testimony from the Foreman, the Engineering Supervisor and the Trackman,
together with the expert witness's report all support the finding made on the property that
Claimant was not injured and falsified his report. In Award No. 109, we analyzed a similar
record as follows, "We cannot say that Carrier was unreasonable in concluding that the evidence
supporting a finding of guilt outweighed the contrary evidence. We conclude that Carrier proved
the charge by substantial evidence." The analysis applies equally to the instant case.
Having concluded that Carrier proved by substantial evidence that Claimant falsified his
injury report, we turn to the penalty imposed. Dishonesty generally is a dismissible offense. We
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Award 115
cannot say that the penalty imposed was arbitrary, capricious or excessive.
AWARD
Claim denied.
Martin H. Malin, Chairman
E. W. Hanqurst . W. Krekc
Carrier Member Employee Member
a
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, January 31, 2009
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