PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO.
6942
Case No. 28
United Transportation Union
and
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Appearances
:
Mr. Richard M. Draskovich, Sr. Vice General Chairperson UTU, 5990 SW 28th Street,
Suite F, Topeka, Kansas 66614-4181, appearing for the Organization.
Mr. Robert A. Henderson, Assistant Director-Labor Relations, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 1400 Douglas Street, STOP 0710, Omaha, Nebraska 68179, appearing for the
Carrier.
ARBITRATION AWARD
The undersigned was appointed as the third or Neutral Member of Public Law
Board No. 6942 on May 3, 2006. The undersigned was assigned this case on May 4,
2006.
Based upon the entire record and arguments of the parties, we issue the following
Award.
DISCUSSION
By letter dated May 19, 2005, the Carrier notified C. E. Scott, Conductor,
("Claimant") to report for a Fitness-for-Duty Examination on Tuesday, May 31, 2005, at
Lincoln and Physical Association & Nebraska Occupational Health in Lincoln, Nebraska.
The letter advised the Claimant that: "Appointments
may not be canceled or changed
without obtaining prior permission from the undersigned. Failure to comply with this
instruction may result in disciplinary action." (Emphasis in the Original). The letter
was signed by Camalynn S. Clark.
By letter dated May 27, 2005, Attorney Mark A. Kille informed Camalynn S.
Clark that the Claimant would not be attending the May 31, 2005 appointment in Lincoln.
In the letter Attorney Kille informed the Carrier that because the Claimant "has not been
advised by his treating physician as having achieved maximum medical improvement, it
is simply premature for him to be evaluated by another physician for a determination of
his fitness for duty."
By letter dated June 13, 2005, the Carrier notified the Claimant to report to the
Conference Room at the Depot at Marysville, Kansas, on June 17, 2005, for investigation
and hearing in connection with his responsibility, if any, for: "Allegedly failed to comply
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with instructions to attend a medical examination on Tuesday, May 31, 2005, which we
were notified of on June 1, 2005."
By letter dated July 6, 2005, the Carrier informed the Claimant that the above
charge against him had been sustained. As a result, according to the letter, the Claimant
was "in violation of General Code of Operating Rule 1.1.3, effective April 2, 2000." The
Carrier assessed the Claimant a "Level 2 Discipline which is five days off work without
pay and you will be placed at the Conference Level in the Behavior Modification Matrix
with a 24-month recovery period." (Emphasis in the Original).
The Organization does not assert any procedural errors.
The Organization argues that the Carrier failed to meet its burden of proof in the
instant case because of mitigating circumstances and, as a result, opines that the
discipline assessed against the Claimant must be reversed. The Carrier takes the opposite
position.
The Organization initially argues that the Claimant "testified that he was unable to
attend the examination because he was in too much pain from his on-duty injury." (Tr. p.
27). However, that is not exactly what he said. In this regard, the record indicates that
the Claimant did not go to the examination because "I really didn't feel like it. I was in
too much pain." Id. (Emphasis added). The Claimant wasn't incapacitated at the time,
(Tr. pp. 16-17), he was just in some pain." (Tr. p. 16). (Emphasis added). He also
wasn't in the hospital, or in jail. (Tr. pp. 16-17).
Based on the above, we conclude that the Claimant was able to attend the
examination but chose not to because he was suffering some, but not debilitating, pain.
The May 19u' notice informed the Claimant that he could not cancel or change the
examination appointment "without obtaining prior permission from the undersigned."
(Tr. p. 13). (Emphasis added). The notice also stated: "Failure to comply with this
instruction may result in disciplinary action." Id. (Emphasis added). The record is clear
that the Claimant did not obtain prior permission from the undersigned to not keep his
appointment.
It is clear from reported arbitration decisions that management has the right,
unless restricted by the agreement, to require employees to have physical examinations
where the right is reasonably exercised under proper circumstances, such as where an
employee desires to return to work following an accident or sick leave. Elkouri and
Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (BNA, 6a' Ed., 2003), p. 825. The Organization has
The Organization does not argue in its "Position" that there are any procedural errors. However,
following the investigative hearing, the Organization asserted that the Carrier committed a fatal procedural
error when the notice of investigation was not issued within 10 days of the date the Carrier knew of the
alleged rules violation. (Carrier's Exhibit C, p. 1 of 2). To the contrary, the record indicates that tire
Claimant's notice was sent out within the timelines on the tenth day after the Carrier was fast notified by
the physician's office that the Claimant did not show up for his medical examination. (Tr. pp. 20-21).
Even the Claimant admits that he received tire Notice of investigation on a timely basis. (Tr. p. 10).
Assuming
armrendo this issue is properly before us, the Organization's argument is rejected.
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pointed out no such restrictions here. The request, on its face, is reasonable. (Transcript
Exhibit C).
Claimant's attorney states in his letter dated May 27, 2005, to the Carrier that the
Claimant will not attend the examination because he "has not been advised by his treating
physician as having achieved maximum medical improvement, it is simply premature for
him to be evaluated by another physician for a determination of his fitness for duty."
(Transcipt Exhibit E). This is not an acceptable excuse. The Carrier is entitled to have
the Claimant examined in order to make its own determination regarding the Claimant's
fitness for duty: If that opinion is different from the Claimant's treating physician's
diagnosis, the parties can go from there. There has been no showing the Claimant was
physically unable to comply with the Carrier's directive.
The Organization also claims that the Claimant "properly used" the Carrier's
empowerment policy which allows employees to "refuse to perform an unsafe act" and
"question a decision that may affect [their] safety or the safety of others." However,
there has been no showing by the Organization that the Carrier's empowerment policy
applies to the facts of this case. In addition, there has been no showing that the Claimant
by complying with the Carrier's directive would be performing an unsafe act and/or
endangering himself or others.
Based on all of the above, we find that the Carrier has proven by substantial
evidence that the Claimant is guilty of the actions complained of.
Based on the foregoing, it is our
AWARD
The grievance is denied, and the matter is dismissed.
Date/d ~a'~t Madison, Wisconsin this 23'd day of May, 2006
~P~MI.J'
~ ~ G l~ I
By Dennis P. McGilligan, Chairm & eutral Member
I coAcur Date ~ ~ I
Df0
I dissent Date
Robert . enderson, for t ie Carrier
I concur Date ~"~'~ I dissent Date
Richard M. Draskovich, for the Organization
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