STATEMENT OF CLAIM:





OPINION OF BOARD:
 On January 9, 10 and 11, 1980 Claimants were assigned to perform maintenance work on a bridge over the Mississippi River near Clinton, Iowa. The situs of this work is in the Illinois Division - Seniority District. 3, upon which Claimants all hold seniority. In addition to the Claimants, on the dates in question Carrier also assigned to this work a B&B gang from the Iowa Division - Seniority District 4. The Organization maintains that such assignment was a patent violation of the senority rights of Claimants which would warrant payment of the present claim initiated on their behalf on February 12, 1980, as follows:
 2

 f::'1 MJn Y K: WaaY in Wthi l,f of t~t `..

 A i,'xt,cary ; . _ -' :.v' ; I

 - MA
 'Y= i r,: .

 A is 14, C

 S . 1 _ a s 1 ." · .. a 5 ·.
,`vi:'li, a.''i i.i1it:.; I'.3,i~..c.G1-,.Ll'lg i..~w,

 Please notify ~;Et·mz·r~I Cha1rna..n K NO

 A11 "ice allQv,ud,

 ermy hnnVuPrtor& at Clinton,

 ev.r acuZa.cabte rate K

 The claim was appealed and denied at all levels of handling on the property, culminating in a denial letter of April 11, 1980, reading in pertinent part
as follows:
During tile winter of 197-19S;7, the Illinois Division was plagued
 by several casualties in the bridge and building area because of
 fires, UeraaillBF_'nt;5 and C`Strlc'I' losses. BF:fl<1i'=t? of thc=.' 7."lttlt'l1nts,
 attention required i0 deal with t}7F':;.' ` C', LLnILaI lv :es, ",`.1CI7 Of ' M;,
 schedule! work and project:; il CI to be defarrod. One such project

 that was OviE'I"rn;1 was work nn the b-idpas at Clinton, Iowa

 ter ull inspection Me n T,'C'C:i-mboj' 10, ), t''.. (..;T'2'l-1r '-s;, , s

 bride,<7 Fsngi_LC.E?r and !n.s Stc:.ft datEe,

 tion did 1.1i fact exist because

a

 Ponvy co

 ars . on

 brld ;f's at Clinton. In o;'CI< . to correct them! definciwnwip~ quickly as possible, the Iowa Division n"::5 crF~.~V ,wa~ u- e c:

 assist the Illinois Division crew i11 working oil the brid);E~ ~e Clinton.

 that a violation

 In fact, the, movumeJlt of for,

 as described above i s clearly supported by the tar«visionp Rule 11(b)* I cannot agree that the Illi!ooib Division arew deprived of their seniority or lost any work an a result of

 Iowa Division assisting them in this project. Lac

 schedule rules and agreements, your claim is denied

 Under these circumstances,

 Rules 4 and 5 arc in evidence.

 I cannot agree

 king support

The Organization cites a number of awards to support the proposition that B&B crews headquartered in a particular division have a right through seniority to perform work arising at that division in preference to other crews from outside the division on which the work is performed. See Rules 4 and 5 and Appendix F. See also, Awards 3-2050; 3-4(x67; 3-11752; 3-19840; 3-20891; 3-22374.
 Carrier apparently does not refute the foregoing general principle, but maintains that the temporary use of this outside B&B crew was specifically authorized by the express language of Rule 11(b), reading as follows:

    (a) Except as provided in Article III of the February 7, 1965 Agreement, employes ,gill not be permanently transferred from one seniority district to another seniority district.


    (b) An employe may be temporarily transferred by the direction of the Company for a period not to exceed six (6) months from one seniority district or division to another, and he shall retain his seniority on the district or division from which transferred. Such employe shall have the right to work temporarily in his respective rank on the district or division to which transferred, if there are no qualified available employes on the district or division. The six (6) month period gay be extended by agreement between the Company and the General Chairman. When released from such service the employe shall return to his former position.


Additionally and alternatively, Carrier notes that even in the absence of
 -contractual authority like Rule 11(b) it has an inherent or retained management authority to make such temporary transfers to meet emergency conditions, notwithstanding Claimant's entitlement to such work under ordinary circumstances. Finally, Carrier contends that if, arguendo, Claimants' rights under the Agreement were violated no basis for the
                                                  '+


damages claimed have been demonstrated because they were "fully employed" on claim dates.
 The first inquiry in this case concerns the effect, if any, of Rule 11(b). Can its face the second sentence thereof seems to render Rule 11(b) inapplicable in the ,facts before us. Carrier urges, however, that it has shown that there were "no qualified available employes on the district or division" because Claimants already had been assigned by Carrier to the bridge maintenance work at issue herein. We find this argument unpersuasive not only because of the bootstrapping implications, but also because the assignment of Claimants to perform bridge maintenance on ,January 9, 10 and II during straight time hours does not show that they were unavailable to perform the contested amount of that work either on overtime or at straight time rates on days before or after January 9, 10 and 11. In that connection, Carrier made a colorable assertion that conditions might arise under which it would be unreasonable or impractical or impossible to consider qualified employes physically present on the division as "available for service." But there is no evidence to support such a conclusion on the present record and neither advocacy nor speculation serve to fill that evidentiary gap. Giving the words of Rule 11(b) their plain and unambiguous meaning, we conclude that Carrier has failed to prove fulfillment of the condition precedent to the temporary transfer and
 -utilization rights granted by said Rule. In the absence of such a showing, Rule 11(b) provides no comfort to Carrier in this case.
 Carrier avers that notwithstanding Rull 11(b) there were "emergency conditions" on the bridge in question which justified the unilateral use of the outside crew to perform work in the Illinois Division seniority
                                                5


district. This assertion is in the nature of an affirmative defense or
 justification for a prima facie violation, however, and accordingly Carrier
 has the burden of developing persuasive evidence of a bona fide emergency.
 The principles governing such determinations are not unknown to these
 parties, having been developed fully in Awards concerning the same Agreement,
 contract previsions and parties as does the present case. We adopt the
 rationale of Award 3-19840 in holding that Carrier on this record has
 failed to present persuasive evidence of the existence of an "emergency"
 which would warrant the violation of Claimants' seniority rights on their
 home district. General deterioration caused by deferred maintenance does
 not carry with it the element of sudden crisis or unforeseeable trauma
 normally associated with the term "emergency". Nor do the relative incon
 venience and/or increased cost associated with having Claimants perform
 the work over six rather than three straight time days or with overtime
 constitute the urgency or immediacy normally associated with the term
 '"emergency". In our judgement, therefore, Carrier has not provided suf
 ficient evidence to establish the validity of its contentions of emergency.
 With respect to the question of damages, we find Awa-d 3-19840 to be
 persuasive and controlling. We shall sustain the claim as presented.

                        AWARD

    Part 1 of the claim is sustained. Part 2 of the claim is sustained. Carrier is directed to implement this Award within thirty (30) days of issuance.


Employe Member C rier Member
                Dana E. Eischen, Chiitrman-y


Date: ~`-,`~T IT~..