Case No. 457
NMB No. 457
SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT NO. 955
AWE NO. 457
C;XTRANSPORTATION INC.
VS.
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNIQN
STA TEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of Louisville Terminal Trainmen Ken
Neeley for $43,000 lump sum payment and
$57,500 separation allowance under CSXT
Labor Agreement 4-86-92.
B;A,CK,.GROUND: On July 31, 1992, CSX Transportation Inc. (hereinafter
carrier) and the United Transportation Union (hereinafter organization)
entered into a memorandum of agreement (CSXT Labor Agreement 4-8692) which represented the "third generation" of Crew Consist Agreements.
We would note parenthetically that the first such "Crew Consist" agreement
was executed February 9, 1986, and avowedly extended certain protections
to all those employees who have instituted essentially identical claims to
those raised in this ("pilot") dispute. Such (third) agreement,
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metaphorically entitled the "Conductor-Only Agreement", prescribed an
implementation date of August 10, 1992, and provided, inter
ate_
lump sum
payments for eligible protected "active service" trainmen as follows
1. Article IX - Lump sum payment of $5,000 dollars ...to each employee
defined as being in active train service on the date
agreement is signed.
2. Side Letter A 1. Productivity Fund Buyout Option - Conductors/
Foreman and Trainmen/Switchmen in active train
service on the date agreement is signed shall receive a
$20,00 lump sum (buyout payment).
2. $35,000 at retirement death, dismissed or resignation
for active (train) service employees on date agreement
is signed.
3. Side Letter 8 1. Article VI D Buyout of Special Crew Allowance
Option -- $18,000 payment for active (train) service
employees on date agreement is signed.
2. $22,500 payment upon retirement death, dismissed or
resignation.
Eligible yardmasters and carrier officials, who were former train service
employees, were provided a special window-of-time within which they
could elect to return to train service and thereby qualify for the above listed
benefits, or waive all such rights. Certain other eligible employees, who
were not in active (train) service on the eligibility date, were conditionally
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entitled to such benefits, "...upon return to service from illness, injury,
furlough (voluntary or involuntary), suspension, dismissal or full-time
organizational service." We would note parenthetically that an unspecified
number of employees who were, and avowedly remain, full time employees
of the organization have already received the above specified payments
without actually returning to active train service. The expressed rationale
for such payments is that the organization and the carrier have historically
considered such (full time) union representatives as "actively working in the
craft" during the entire term of their approved leaves of absence.
EVIDENCE: On July I, 1992, Louisville Trainman Ken Neeley
(hereinafter claimant) exercised his option under an October 31, 1985,
Mediation Agreement (Case A-1 1 4'71) to accept promotion to the craft of
engineer ($LL Agreement). Such election did not sever claimant's (UTU)
trainman seniority, however, once he assumed such (engineer) position he
was contractually barred from returning to trainman service as long as he
was needed to protect an engineer position (seniority). We would note
parenthetically that there is no contractual definition of "needed"; ergo, the
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carrier arguably had the unilateral right to make such operational
determination.
Following claimant's voluntary ascension to the engineer craft his
relevant work history was essentially as follows:
?! 1192 Engine Service
1113!93 Involuntarily removed from engine service
1/17193 Exercised his trainman seniority to hold a train service
position
1131/93 Recalled to engine service
2/2/93 Exercised engine service seniority
Since February 2, 1993, claimant has been required (operational need) to
remain in engine service at all times relevant to this dispute. .
On March 25, 1993, the organization instituted an action on behalf of
Trainman Neeley and all other employees similarly situated, alleging that
all such claimants had been wrongfully barred from accessing such bonuses
through a combination of carrier requirements (operational need) and the
restrictions included in an agreement with a third party (BLE) organization.
In practical effect, counsel for the organization argues that such need is
contrived to block claimant's otherwise rightful access to these earned
bonuses.
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The carrier denied such claim, explaining in pertinent part as follows:
"Please refer to your letter dated March 25, 1993, file 376-Y0529,
concerning claim filed in behalf of Louisville Ken Neeley (194292) for 543,000
lump sum payment and S5?,504 separation allowance under CSXT Agreement 486-92.
Your letter does not state any reason why Mr. Neeley would be entitled to
the lump sum payment or the separation allowance under CSXT Labor Agreement
4-86-92. It is very difficult to research a claim when no information is given as to
why the claim was filed and may be valid under agreements.
As shown by our records, on July 31, 1992, Mr. Neeley was regular
assigned as engineer at Louisville, Ky. Mr. Neeley was in engineer service from
July 1, 1992, through present date, except for a 2 week period in January 1993,
which he worked - as a switchman.
Mr. Neeley was in engineer service on July 31, 1992, and even though he
returned to train service for a very brief period, he did not meet the definition of
an `active service' employee as defned by CSXT Labor Agreement 4-86-(g)-92
which states:
'It was agreed in the application of these agreements an
active service
employee is defined as follows:
"Active service" includes those employees who return to service as
trainmen or conductors from illness, injury, furlough (voluntary or
involuntary), suspension, dismissal, or
full-time Organization
service. The
amounts they receive will be equal to the
amounts they would have
received on the date of the
Agreement.'
As you can see, Mr. Neeley does not meet the requirements of an 'active
service' employee and the claim fled in his behalf is without merit and is
declined in its entirety."
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Such claim was thereafter processed to this Board for final resolution.
FINDINGS: Under the whole record and all the evidence, after hearing, the
Board finds that the parties
herein are
carrier and employee within the
meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, and this Board is duly
constituted by agreement and has jurisdiction of the parties and subject
matter.
The parties agree that the dispute pivots on the meaning of the phrase
in active service. The carrier argues that it means active service as a
trainman/yardrnan. The Organization initially contends that such phrase
only requires active service with the carrier in any capacity; ergo, if the
affected employee holds trainmen seniority and would be working in such
craft, but for the carrier's requirements, then the individual claim for all
earned bonuses should be summarily granted.
In practical effect the organization's first alternative argument
equates claimant's (engineer) assignment to those eligible employees on
involuntary furlough. Union counsel avows that during negotiations the
carrier representatives verbally agreed that those former trainmen, who were
then working in engine service "...would not be moved into or kept in such
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service unless needed to protect such service." Extending such verbal
commitment they argue that the carrier has failed to offer credible proof of
any real continuing need. As a second alternative basis for this Board to
grant these claims, counsel argues that if management personnel were
allowed a limited "window" to elect to return to train service then it is
discrimination, 12er se, to deny claimant that same opportunity for recovery.
The phrase "continue in active service" is not new to railroad industry
agreements, it most often appears in connection with retroactive general pay
increases. Often such qualifying provision has been inserted into the
retroactive provision in order to preclude payments to employees who have
quit or been terminated prior to the effective date. However, the bonus
payments in this dispute cannot be unconditionally compared to a general
wage increase (PLB 3882,,Award l 5__,5 (Cluster, 1993), First Division Award
No-2441 2 (Richter, 1994), PLB 5191,,Award 2 (Euxer, 1993)].
Notwithstanding the organization's allegations (parole evidence)
concerning the negotiators' dialogue, the "bargain and consideration"
specifically reflected in the terms of these agreements appears to have been
carefully designed; only certain and very specific categories of employees
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were declared eligible for such bonus. Clearly claimant does not "fit" into
any of these defined eligibility classes.
The present claim requests the Board to uphold petitioner's request
for two lump sum payments predicated on the single fact that claimant held
trainman's seniority, notwithstanding the additional fact that he was in
service and working as an engineer on the dates indicated hereinabove.
Because the movants (organization) bear the burden of proof, we cannot
ignore the void in the record of any credible evidence that the carrier ever
expressly or impliedly agreed that employees, like claimant, would be
declared eligible, notwithstanding the specific limitations adopted. Counsel
for the organization resourcefully argues that because claimant is obligated
to protect his seniority as an engineer at the unilateral discretion of the
carrier, it is patently unfair to hold that his working status on one specific
1
eligibility date should control the validity of his otherwise valid claim for
the (two) lump sum payments.
All of these arguments raised by the organization are both reasonable
and resourceful, and would be given pivotal consideration if we were a
board of equity, and/or we had both the parole evidence and the authority to
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reform the Agreement so as to be completely fair. However, our
jurisdiction is very narrow; we are limited to the "interpretation and
application of the parties' Agreements" as written. Consequently our
decision must be founded solely upon the proven intent of the contracting
parties as manifested by the language used, utilizing the applicable and
recognized rules of contract construction. To hold otherwise would expose
our conclusions to being overturned by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Sympathetic as we might be, we are not authorized to dispense our own
brand of industrial justice (Steelworkers' trilogy and its progeny).
Such jurisdictional limitation is a sound principle of statutory and
contract construction and, in this case, destroys any inference and rejects
any interpretation that employees working in another craft on the designated
eligibility date were intended to be considered as "active employees,"
merely because they had trainmen's seniority and would have opted to work
in such craft if such alternative were available. If there are inequities in the
system, as the Organization contends, it is a matter that only the parties may
remedy by modifying the expressed eligibility requirements.
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In arriving at our conclusion we are also aware that in some of the
claims filed in concert with this appeal, one or more employees may have
had contributions made to the Productivity Fund in their behalf, for which
they might even have subsequently recovered. However, that is not one of
the qualifying conditions for these lump sum distributions, and agaip we are
not privileged to change the Agreement based upon our perception of the
equities involved.
In this particular dispute the claimant did not have the opportunity to
contribute to the Productivity Fund on those (1 Z) days that he worked in
train service in early 1993, inasmuch as such fund had previously been
closed (bought out) concurrent with the implementation of the 1992
Conductor-Only Agreement. It was a result of that "buy out" agreement
that accruals to the Productivity Fund ceased; therefore, there was no
contribution made in behalf of Claimant Neeley and there was nothing for
him to recover.
As regards the collateral issue of disparate treatment (full time
organizational representatives receiving bonus payments), we find such
persons to have been uniquely situated and the beneficiaries of a clear and
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prevailing practice. Clearly such practice is a circumstance that
distinguishes their (sic) threshold eligibility from this particular claimant.
ADD: Claims denied
DON B. HAYS, Neutral Me er
R. O. KEY, Carrier lumber . L. Organization Member
ATE