Org. File 210-57-9766 Oecisfon Ho. 5184
 Co. File TRN I_-7·1 Case nn. 1231
 Supplemental List Re. 91
 SPECIAL APJUSTMENT BOARD NO. 18
 (Train Service Panel)

 PARTIES TO DISPUTE: United Tran3Portation Onion -

$TATIMENT OF CLAIM: 'Neauest of Brakeman Keith N. Karns. Los Angeles Division. r6? a ns a e-an to service with seniority unimpaired and for replacement of wage loss and productivity credits resulting from his dismissal from service on March 11, 1987, as well as wage loss while attending investigation on February 5. 6 12. 13 and 20. 1987, because of his alleged violation of Rules I and 607 of tAe General Code of Operating Rules. which occurred betreen March 15, 1?77 and December 12, 1986."

 STATFf1ENT OF FACTS: On January 6, 1967 the Carrier directed the Claimant to
 attend The notice read in pertinent part as follows:






























FINDINrS: The Hoard finds. after hearim upon the whole record and all evidenCr TE=a Parties herein are Carrier and tivloya within the aoanino of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, that this Hoard is duly constituted by Agreement and it has ,Jurisdiction of the Parties and the subject matter. and that the parties were given due notice of the hearing held.

 DECISION: The letter of discharge cited the Claimant for his responsibility fn TaFMnq to "work safely and injury free" in Connection with twelve instances over his twelve-year career. viewed broadly, the Carrier has concluded that the Claimant is 'accident prone.' They Contend this is demonstrated by the Ctainant's responsibility in each of the incidents, the Claimant's record as a whole and his record compared to other employees. Accordingly, they assert he is an unreasonable risk to the Carrier, himself and other employees.

 The basic premise of the Carrier's case is that a series of inhnies, which individually wouldn't he a basis for discharge, can be, in certain circuastanees, considered together for the purposes of concluding an employee is unsuitable for employment. It is true that other Boards have agreed with this premise. It is also true--strictly speaking as a general setter--that this Board cannot quarrel with this pramtst.

 Nowevrr, the mere fact that an employee has a series of )niuries or that it may exceed some kind of norm is not enough to support a conclusion that an ennloyee is accident prone or an unwarranted risk. The Carrier has the burden of digging deeper. The Carrier gust convince the Board that all of the circumstances, not just the nrre freaueney of Injuries, do in fact add up to 'accident proneness:

 The Board realizes that there are "accident prone" people. It Is difficult to set forth a standard which precisely defines what constitutes accident' proneness. Yet It is reCOgniZablt. He know It when we See it. It 13 poSsihte only--because of the nature of the subject and the infinite variety of imponderables In individual cases--to set forth a guideline to the relevant factors, Some of the factors are (11 the derronstrated degree to which an employee has bean responsible for various injuries, (2) the frequency of occurrences, 13) whether there is truly any demonstrable difference between the Claimant and the record of others, (41 efforts at counseling, training and prooressive discipline, isl the attitude of the employee toward safety, !6) whether efforts have been made prior to discharge to offer--without prejudice-alternative employment. (7) the period of time involved. )H) the nature of the injury and (9) medical evidence as noted in Decision No. 4114.

One of the east Important of all these factors is the first. to wit, the degree of the Clafaunt's negligence 1n Lath case. The difficulty presented by this case and others like it is the fact that the various cases relied on by Management can fall within several categories of negligence. or in other words, the past cases may represent a whole range of negligence from anywhere frao little or no negligence to gross negligence and any combination in between.

 Several eategorles of Injuries can be identified which constitute the ranoe of negligence in such eases. one class of past injury--which 1n fact exists fn this case--is a situation where the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the C1airtant had no responsibility. For the sake of discussion, let's call this Class I. The next class of case in degree would be where the evidence doesn't show that the Grievant was at fault but it doesn't show they weren't at fault either. In other words, that there would be a basis to he suspicious of carelessness.

 The third class would be an injury situation where there was demonstrable but limited negligence on the part of an employee. The last class would be where the evidence would satisfactorily show that the employee was fully responsible for the injury.

 Obviously, as the combination of the various cases tend toward the lesser classes (Class I and II1, the Carrier's burden becomes more difficult and the various injuries tend toward the categories of greater neg linence. their burden is lesser. In this case, several of the past injuries fall in the Class I category. The Grievant had no or deminiuus responsibility in the 7-14-17. 3-14-82. 7-19-82, 7-31-83, 10-2-83 and 12-14-84 incidents. On July 14, 1977. he strained his knee fleainQ front the first unit to the second unit for protection as a Collision with a gravel truck at a grade crossing was inninent. The Claimant'was cleared of responsibflfty of the 3-1a-82 incident in Decision 5606 which was caused by severe slack action in spite of his being properly braced. On July 19, 1982 a nail .as protruding from a chair he was moving which Caused the puncture. On July 31. 1983 a vandal threw a beer bottle through the window of the Clairant's caboose and an December 14, 1984 the Claimant was ridina to the rear seat of a three-seat taxicab, facing the rear. Men the taxi rounded a curve and struck a vehicle standfna with its lights out. Clearly, all of these Incidents were situations over which the Claim,nt had no control nor Is there any credible evidence that he contributed to the injuries. Thus, they can be given no weight in the overall picture of accident proneness.

 This leaves only six injuries fn the Orievant's twelve-year tenure of an? possfble consecIverrce concerning accident proneness. Only the last injury Could 0e considered more then the Class 11 type of injury. The trievant clearly had some responsibility in the last incident since he didn't even bother to alert the Conductor to his pact problems before tryinq to move the extremely heavy draft gear assembly. This was careless and imprudent. At least this much caution should have been exhibited.

The question remains, weighing all the circumstances against the relevant criteria whether discharge is appropriate. In the Mard'S opinion, it is not. The six incidents evidenced in this record in a twelve-year period are not a basis for discipline when viewed in light of the other relevant factors. However, given the Clalxant's responsibility in the fecember 12. 1986 incident, some discipline would have been appropriate. AccordinQiy, the discharge is reduced to a 30-day suspension. the Clainant is entitled to rainstat*s~ent and back pay beyond a 30-day suspension.

    The claim is sustained to the extent Indicated above.


                      rrDert H. Vernon

                      Chairman and Neutral Menber


                      ~.Ase

                      Carrier 4amber


                      i1ynni ragner

                      EmplMenher


Oatad this ~, day o~, 1988. San Francisco, Caiifor

 a6xclr31 149-6