SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT NO. 957
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
"AUTHORITY"
AND
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE
OF WAY EMPLOYES
"ORGANIZATION"
STATEMENT OF CLFlI1
AWARD NO. 21
Claim of the Brotherhood (BMWE-86-7-Fii) that:
The Authority has violated Article V, Section 514
(b), and other pertaining rules of the Scheduled
Agreement, when on September 12 and 13, 1986, it
assigned overtime work to a junior 2nd class painter
instead of Claimant E. Burbage.
REMEDY:
The Claimant, 2nd Class Painter E. Burbage, shall
be paid for elevenP(11) hours at the punitive time rate
of pay of the 2nd class painter position.
OPINION OF THE BOARD
Claimant, E. Burbage, contends that he was improperly denied
overtime work. The organization seeks overtime paid,for Claimant
for the time he was not permitted to work.
The basic facts are not complex. Claimant, painter second
class, was assigned to work at the Wayne Station during the
latter part of July, 1986. On or about September 9, 1986
Claimant was reassigned to the East Falls Station for unspecified
reasons. Subsequently, on September 12 and 13, 1986 overtime
work was performed at the Wayne Station. The overtime work was
two hours on September 12 and nine hours on Saturday, September
13. Claimant was not offered the opportunity to perform this
overtime work, even though the overtime was performed by an
employee junior to the Claimant. Subsequent to September 13,
Claimant was discharged for reasons unrelated to this case.
The Authority maintains that as Claimant was discharged
subsequent to the events herein involved, this claim is moot and
therefore non-arbitrable. Moreover, according to the Authority,
the claim is without merit, as Claimant was not the incumbent at
the Wayne Station project since he had previously been assigned
to another painting project. The Authority therefore believes
Claimant was not entitled to the overtime assignment by virtue
of Section 514 (d) of the contract.
The Organization asserts that under the provisions of
section 514, Claimant was entitled to the overtime in question,
as he was the incumbent' of the position requiring overtime. The
Organization notes that Claimant had the same foreman and was a
member of the same crew as that which performed the overtime
work. According to the organization, Award No. 4 of this Board
makes clear that in these circumstances Claimant was the
incumbent, even though he was not assigned to the work site at
which the work took place.
The Agreement provision germane to this case is as follows:
Article V - Section 514 - Overtime
a) Pay time for overtime work in excess of eight (8)
hours per day will be one and one-half times the
regular rate of pay. Hours in excess of forty (40)
worked in a calendar week will be paid at time and half
time.
d) In assigning overtime, SEPTA's general practice
will be to give preference to the incumbent of the
position requiring overtime. If the incumbent refuses
the work, it will then be offered in seniority order to
available, qualified employes present at the location.
The Board has determined that the claim must be sustained in
part.
Concerning the Authority's contention that this claim was
made moot by the Claimant's subsequent dismissal,, the Board
rejects this position. Claimant is entitled to any remedy for
any contract violation which took place while he was still
.employed. There is nothing in the collective bargaining
4
agreement that dictates a contrary conclusion.
The Board has determined that the Claimant was "the
incumbent" of the position performing the disputed overtime work
on September 12 and 13. Although Claimant was not working at the
av
Wayne Station where the work was performed, he had the same
foreman as those employees working at that location. In these
circumstances, Award No. 4 is applicable to this dispute. In
Award No. 4, this Board (Sirefman, chairman) stated in relevant
part:
The organization contends that as the senior
employee, Claimant was the incumbent and that SEPTA
should have contacted him before assigning the overtime
opportunity to the junior employee. SEPTA contends
that section 514 (d) does not require that preference
be given to the "senior" incumbent. Rather, as
Claimant had already left and Helper Rose had remained
on the property, the latter was the incumbent and the
most senior employee available, qualified, and present
3
X57 ~I
at the location when the assignment became available.
In the Board's opinion SEPTA's contention is not
persuasive. The section's reference to "general
practice" contemplates that except for unusual
circumstances, e.g., an emergency, a set procedure for
assigning overtime will be utilized. Nothing in this
record indicates that an emergency or unusual
circumstance was present on April 28th. Furthermore,
' the language of the section also contemplates that
there is an employee who is "tike.. incumbent", as
compared to the second sentence which speaks of
overtime being offered to other "employes". There is
no contractual definition of "incumbent".
Nevertheless, that there be a rational process for
determining who that is must have been contemplated by
the Parties when they negotiated this provision.
It has long been arbitral practice to select an
interpretation of contract language which is clear,
objective, orderly and practical. In industrial
relations seniority has long been widely accepted as
satisfying these criteria. To base 'incumbency' upon
which employee remains longer on the property than
another after the work day is completed, or to simply
select an employee who happens to be there when the
need arises, would make the overtime assignment process
accidental, haphazard, disorderly and implausible.
Indeed, there is nothing in this record to establish
that Claimant was in error in leaving the property when
he did nor to establish that Helper Rose was required
to be there when the call from the contractor came in.
Therefore, the Board is persuaded that the
Claimant as senior General Helper was "the incumbent"
for the purposes of section 514 (d). SEPTA was
required by that section to notify Claimant of the
opportunity, and only upon Claimant's refusal could the
assignment have been given to another employee. The
Foreman's selection of Helper Rose was in violation of
the Agreement. This determination does not change or
amend the Agreement, but interprets it within the
context of accepted arbitral principles as does the
awarding to Claimant of the wages he would have earned
had his overtime opportunity not been improperly
bypassed.
Award No. 4 sets the precedent that incumbency is not
determined by "who happens to be there when the need arises".
Thus, employees who perform the same work and have the same
4
foreman are all to be considered for purposes of -determining
incumbency under the provisions of Section 514 (d).
Award No. 4 also sets the precedent that incumbency is to be
determined by seniority. Thus, as Claimant was senior to an
employee who performed overtime on September 12 and 13, it
follows that he was the incumbent rather than the employee who
performed the job. This finding does not, however, end the
Board's inquiry. Section 514 does not require that the incumbent
be granted an overtime assignment in all circumstances. Rather,
section 514 requires only that the "general practice will be to
give preference to the incumbent of the position requiring
overtime." The provision clearly envisions that there will be
some circumstances in which the incumbent will not receive the
overtime. This was further recognized in Award No. 4 of this
Board, which held that "unusual circumstances, e.g., an
emergency" would negate the need for overtime to be assigned to
This Board now determines that when a small amount of
overtime is performed at the end of the shift, and the incumbent
is not at or in the immediate vicinity of the work location where
the overtime work is to be performed, the Authority is not
obligated to transport the incumbent to the involved work site to
perform the overtime work. It appears to the Board that it would
simply be impractical to require one employee to cease his work,
and another employee to go to that location and complete a small
~r
amount of the remaining overtime work. Such a practice would
5
also be inconsistent with Section 1005 of the Contract,
(Productivity) which states that "all parties are charged with
the responsibility of positively and cooperatively advising
management concerning means of improving productivity
by ...reducing overtime ...."
The Board has further determined, however, that when an
entire shift or otherwise large amount of overtime work is
involved, the Carrier is obligated to offer the work to the
incumbent. In those circumstances, the incumbent's right to
generally receive overtime work outweighs the practical and
efficiency considerations that allow a non-incumbent to do a
small amount of overtime at the end of a shift. There appears to
be no reason why a qualified incumbent who works at one location
cannot be told to report on a day off to perform a shift of
overtime work at another location. If the Authority was not
obligated to give such overtime work to the incumbent, the
Authority would be frei' to deprive employees whom it considers
undesirable of overtime assignments, as it could simply assign
senior employees to locations where no overtime was to be
performed, while allowing junior employees to work at places
involving regular overtime assignments.
Applying these principles to the case now before the Board,
it is apparent that the Claimant was not entitled to the two
hours of overtime work on Friday, September 12 but was entitled
to perform the nine hours of overtime work on Saturday,
September 13. The two hours on September 12 were apparently at
6
the end of the shift. While the record is not explicit as to how
far the Claimant was working from the Wayne Station, it does not
appear that he was in the immediate vicinity. In these
circumstances, the Authority was contractually permitted to
assign the work to an employee already at the Wayne Station who
was already performing the work. On September 13, however,
Claimant's incumbency status created an obligation for the
Carrier to assign him the work. There is no reason why Claimant
could not have been told to report to the Wayne Station on that
morning and perform the work.
AS
to remedy, the Authority shall be directed to compensate
Claimant at the overtime rate. Imposition of the overtime rate
is not done for punitive purposes, but rather to make Claimant
whole for wage loss suffered as a result of him not receiving
overtime work to which he was entitled. In addition, it appears
that Award No. 4 set a precedent of granting remedies in cases
such as this at the oveAime rate, as the Board there sustained a
claim for overtime rate payments for a violation involving a
Claimant improperly being denied an opportunity of work overtime.
7
AWARD
Claim sustained in part. Monies owed shall be paid within
30 days of the date of this Award.
.B. BIRNBRAUE~
' w.
E. LaRUE
v~
Authority Member Organization Member
S. E. BUCHHEIT
Neutral Member